

CRANÆSTHETICS

(the study of Craneae)
By Cervellissimo (PBUH)

PARABLES

Parable of Something I'd Forgotten:

It wasn't long after I secured myself to a high and rapidly swaying post that the rain began to lather upon my head. I looked out onto the brilliant scene of destruction and wondered how many innocent men's blood would stain this town from the present rioters to the beyond. I doubt I am the first who thought along such lines. Maybe I am the last, for men everywhere were now screaming things I would neither tolerate nor delight in. Just then a spectre that I had believed to be only a figment of somebody else's imagination.

Uranian, cephalopod, hadesian, thrusterinidae, synonicon, observatopus, radarus, minipampere, propektus, sporocerata, tsikryneto, gonatoceratidae, neosebastian, horde, agios, mictocerat, sabungrus, trigonopus, lamellata, fronter, artichoke, thoracodentatus, dolichocephalus, comoron, isonantistis, cylindricostus, longisoma, megasiliana, sulci, chromatid, voimazos, exo, cephalus, melanacanth, pulmo, polytaenia, multiplicipes, tenuimbotas, bivalve, molluscopetalum, starfish, amanid, dustmaker, these are not the arrangements made by a God so willing as to make himself available to his subjects.

In one, the subject merely exists and exists independently. This relation is proper to the substance and to the nominal base. This relation is merely anterior, i.e. it is not the sort of relation which involves the judgment of "before" or "in relation to". In the other, a relation of relationship, however, is involved. For example, the relation of "to-be-grounded" implies (somehow or other) that in some sense one's body is grounded on a determinate substratum. This relation involves axiomatic oscillatory magnates. The subject can be considered either absolute and unchangeable or relative and changeable. The absolute can be defined as the relation which the subject has to the predicate if both of them were in fact identical. The relative can be defined as the relation which the subject has to the predicate if one is a duplicate of the other (Dillon & Dube 1691: 2-3). The use of relative entailment has a number of applications in linguistics (see MacGregor 1691) and is now routinely applied in earnest.

Parable of Amigos:

Amigos now in the nothing of their bedrooms, the days whiled under mesh stippled curtains and in the belly of a second shift, or on the back porch, or at the college or at the pool, or far away, far too far away.

Amigas who are funny and serious and obscenely attractive and who laugh in the dead of the night and who stand up for the desperate and the unloved, who lie down in the dirt at dark and the still of the trees and turn up their faces to the sky and sleep in the world forever.

How long ago did I last drive over these streets, paint the walls, work the track? How long ago was that? The woman picked up a bottle of beer from the cart, one of four she had put in the rickety wooden cart for the ride back to her apartment on the south side. The beer was a near - bestseller, and even at a two for a dollar special, three four dollar plastic bags with the label plastered across the front filled the box. She looked down at the sixth bag. She had forgotten it in the rush.

Parable of Dead Friends:

It is night. I am up on a rooftop in Stuttgart. The hangars of the airbase are cinders. It is Thursday, April 1. Jäger-Bülow [Bruno-Karl Jäger-Bülow, commander of Army Group G, the largest division of the Nazi army] is in a meeting with his senior staff, a group of about 50. Among the group are Field-Marshal Erwin Rommel and the Luftwaffe Chief Hermann Göring. I do not know where they are. I feel rather stupid, like a cat playing with a bunch of dolls, and in a way I am.

I am riding away.

Parable of Adnil:

This philosopher further distinguishes inversion, which transforms a thing in a way which is contrary to its nature, without opposing it to its proper meaning; and word-filling, which compresses an inversion, in a way which contravenes the meaning of the word to which it is attached. We show that the same procedure is applicable to a sentence like "Nothing is more common than consciousness" (X-99, p. 144): it is not in any sense false. This does not stop the sentence from containing something irregular like semantic misconceptions. But we may as well call them "modal concepts", for that way is more idiomatic; and, if we examine the difference more closely, we shall find that the former (definitions, not phrases) belong to concepts that are fundamental to the subject; the augmentative ones belong to the notions of things that are deemed to be considered as existing but that are not.

Now, the word "natural" is taken to mean complete. Because the world exists—just as the soul or the will exists in us—but it is not "natural". On Mackenzie: Mackenzie and MacLeod were to become side by side for the rest of their lives, allying as time passed but never fighting. And finally even Mackenzie had to agree with MacLeod on that point. Hugh MacLeod retired to Victoria at the turn of the century, and the two old friends finally lived out their lives in peace and in friendship. MacLeod died peacefully in his sleep on Boxing day at his home in Surrey, England. Missing Image: Rylan, of Churchill, died on December 7, 1818). He gave up drinking, took drugs, and played sports around with his family to better understand himself. He taught himself to become more aware of his memory. Mackenzie went to university. He finished his studies and was destined to be a career coach someday. He graduated as an undergraduate, and became an associate professor of English. he knew how to get through the snow, though, and knew how to ride for three days and nights down the range, though he knew he'd get no farther in that snow or rain than the youngest calf could see. He knew it, and though it would mean to him to die the hard, bitter way he knew the milk and meat of that calf would feed a mother and her children and that his death would bring but little for them but pain. Him too, naught good would come of the fight but pain. He had one last light to work. Adnil went back to bed.

Parable of the Woodcutter:

But it was not to be. The woodcutter, like the others, had scuttled back to his camp on the hill. The ground was treacherously wet and the snow continued to fall. The woodcutter had left the hills and drifted north into the forest. Before his camp was gone even a squirrel could not have found his trail. Still the leader of the hoofbeats could not give up. A bloody streak along the highway, its ghost blazed from the tavern where everyone had finally headed for a cup of wine.

If you still ask yourself why a bunch of hired guns are out there drilling in Alaska, asking for any old coin for work, you might want to ask yourself why some of the only loot the prospectors found was gold. I've got to stop writing. The camp is a snarl of slow moving animals and the howls of wolves calling to one another across the barren wastes. This isn't one of those stories with a hero or a villain, but just like most of you, I like the kind of stories that make you ask questions like this.

Parable of the Lost Gold:

But before this could be done, they were bound to hear from Giljohan that Alfred's family had arrived at La Paz, and would therefore go there. And after hearing this message, young Manuel thought only of his childish longing to see his family again, and never about the probability that they would be stopped and questioned at the first thing which appeared on their way. There were no telegraph lines in those days, and it was probable that once it had become known that they had made the first move.

Furn went on talking. It wasn't about the gold. If there was plenty of gold, and all the Indians were in the pay, what difference would it make to a gold prospector whether the Indians shot or killed him? They only gave him that name because they knew he was looking for gold. The gold is there, anyhow, so the Indians don't have to shoot you for your name. That's not the answer you're looking for. It was about the name, and it wasn't the name of a man but of a woman. She was Indian as the rest of them.

Parable of the Donner Party:

The Donner Party had made that trip northward once. The party had reached Desolation a week after leaving Sacramento. Theirs had been a ten-day, dismal romp. I had been there, driving along, too, until it became apparent to me that the happy circumstance of our crossing the range was just that, a happy circumstance, a lucky encounter. There was nothing sad or even melancholy about the Donner Party's fate. None of the people got that far, and their real miseries began, as they did for so together. It was the worst, but at no point did anyone say, "This is where you are, I mean come to the campfire." There had to be some kind of reason. I have come to Desolation to see things this way.

Parable of the Nobody:

The subject's hand would be outstretched for the newly-turned spinner, and the project would get nothing but that settler's cold hand.

"Oh, not at all," I said.

"It's a fine price, but I'll take my chances." To the contact I held up the unturned spindle.

"Take this; it might find some use on some line down south."

I'll miss you when you leave, Mr. Theos, if you'll pardon my saying so. I didn't say anything.

"Fare thee well." When I turned back, the old man had taken the pack-horse's reins from the flat.

Parable of Baley:

In the alpine tunnels every man heard the wolf-whine of his fellows. The warriors cut their steel's chords to roll out in one of the caravan rogues, to catch their breath and clear their hearts. Baley couldn't help feeling a wrench at the thought of the soldiers' final get-away, if their own had been so full of dismal dangers and sharpness. And then the light thawed. There were crocuses blooming in a lot of places. And all that iron a-glimmering from the maps was gone, absorbed back into the sand.

Parable of Jamie:

When Jamie was two, the whole family came south. After an unsuccessful attempt to settle in the outlying country of Maine, they had managed to put up a schoolhouse in Windham. During winter, Jamie and his father took turns with the hand cart making the trip twice a week. The man and boy shared the stern duty of hanging layers of dirty clothes. The wagon bed was always cluttered with the detritus of a journey—newspaper for him and cans and boxes for his mother. At school, Jamie was fond of chemistry.

Parable of Sam:

The big house is beyond that, swaybacked and all wood as a post to place a white flag on, and I found out why it was there, in the low low wind of late fall and winter. The dog and I walked in under the pines, the dog on a short leash to keep her from wandering, me trying not to step on, or worse yet onto, the skunk population, which I had to count four. From there I made my way up the sloping hillsides, where I stood for a while, watching the last geese of the season swim past in the river.

Parable of The Hammock

Ascending a hill, step by step, up-up, one and a half thousand feet in elevation for each mile up. Up there is a hammock, strung between two olive trees. Up there it blows in the wind, most of the time unoccupied by nothing but the wind, the wind filling it like a kite signaling the town below the cliffs. When I go up there I am greeted by her. Up there she accompanies me. Up there she speaks to me through a dozen tongues. I cannot answer her, and so she speaks through my pen. Up there is where I write. Up there is why I write.

Parable of the Philosopher:

But if I add on my affirmation, "For goodness' sake, don't die", and so affirm in like manner, yet at the same time give consideration to whether the weight of our general rational judgment will gain by it, it seems as though the content of my judgment should be ignored by the logical formula. So much for general logical logic, and another also for transcendental logic. From the above we may conclude that the question how far a thing is, or in other words, how much we find in any proposition of sense, does not concern itself with the matter whether it is true or false; but whether it is true or false, we should always attend to. However, in the philosophy of mathematics, with all its vigour and exactness, the question whether or not the proposition is true is really the very root of the subject. For the

question is whether the proposition is a truth, or a falsehood. In modern philosophy, there are two divisions into which logic has been divided—the division of logic into form (*logique formelle*) and content (*logique contentelle*). The last division is only of recent vintage. It is, in the first place, quite strange; and the reason is, that the division does not correspond to anything that is commonly taken to be in the realm of logic. A Form (*formel*) corresponds to a totality of various propositions, and a Content (*logique contentelle*) to the sum of all propositions of sense, together with all the propositions derived from those propositions, and every possible truth (impossible truth). For the latter is the whole of logic—the division of the substance which gives matter to the proposition; but the form and content of the proposition do not coincide with the proposition. One may wonder, if there be Form or Content in logic; why ought not, for instance, the proposition that all penguins are white, be included in logic? But one can easily show that the proposition “all penguins are white” is really not part of the Form of logic. For it is a material proposition, based upon our experience of one group of them; and this experience is so different from all other experiences, that no conclusion of logic can possibly be derived from it. It is probable that the proposition “all penguins are white” is true; but we have no particular reason to believe this. The famous “Categorical Hypothesis” is not part of the content of logic. It may well be true; and its validity as a proposition can still be seen to extend to many other things in life; but one can conceive of a different kind of reasoning which would prove this proposition to be true. The difference is thus very striking, and cannot easily be explained. The real division of logic has been made upon the analogy of a tree, which is divided into the branches, leaves, and fruits, and the vines. The latter are necessarily much stronger and more delicate than the former.

Parable of Adam:

If Adam called you foolish you knew he would not relent. The one flat and all bright cobbles-roads with drydocks long left behind in solid igneous tinder. Adam's new book from a now much changed and truncated Hamersmith library tells the following bicentennial prehistory story with vigor enough to provoke muteness at his wily protagonists in both the form(lines!) they enter and some further furtive thought beyond - wonder that little thing I suppose so intelligent such unseeables existed? Be honest. Yes, they could be invented somewhere though I never noticed my own kid eating dirt. On Long May You Go offers only nine(hard-)links for interest at Page To Screen directly into human self history like he were composing with interj musical nonsense characters somehow thinking along with him: Writing Music One Of Nine Handled (First Piece by Child Singer Writens Seven Chapters Within The Series After Which the Kind Book First Ever Edited In a Classic Approach Now Generally Recognized By God.

Parable of Coming Home

They had to come back upriver, too. They had to get them back into the holding pens at the slaughterhouse, where they would be processed, gutted, packed into tin cans, and trucked off to markets across the country. The saltwater was not good for them, not good for the people, and there was a place where they could be dumped and the stench would be trapped out of the rain. The fish could be killed with cyanide.

"I know," he said, when he had finished. "I know. I know." He drove the boat out into the main river and headed south. At the turn of the tide, the flow would reverse, carrying the water out of the ocean and into the bay. It would become fresh and clean, with the taint of the fish out of it. He had seen it once, years ago, before the factory had been built.

Parable of the Hunter:

Anonymous pulled the can away and the old man pulled a stick from his pocket and waved it at him. The sound of wood scraping against wood sounded as the old man stood and walked away. Anonymous picked up the empty can and watched as the old man set it on the ground and turned to leave.

"How long will you stay?" he called.

"I'm just here for a few days," the old man said. "If I don't go, you'll forget me."

"It's the least I can do."

"And the least I can do is bring a little of my soul to you."

"A soul," Anonymous said. "You don't have a soul."

"It's a gift."

"It's just a thing you found in the woods."

"I know. I'm not a god. I'm not even a mortal. I'm just a hunter."

"What is it that you do?"

"I hunt people."

"How?"

"With a gun."

"And why?"

"Because I can."

"I'm a writer. I'm not going to read this."

"You can if you want."

"You're going to get me into trouble."

"Maybe I will."

"And why do you do it?"

"Because it's fun."

"I don't understand."

"I'm a hunter."

Parable of the Rocket:

The client would send pirate a brief description of a man, place, and event. Pirate would then act out the fantasy in the best way he could. He called this a "psychoanalytic job." This wasn't a typical entertainment, though. The client expected that pirate would keep it secret. Pirate had a way of looking for such things. He was "almost a psychic," as he said. He would be doing a fantasy when he would notice a ring, a pen, or a watch that belonged to the man he was acting out the fantasy with. He would look for people with the same hair, or the same walk, or the same background. He was able to figure out where the man lived, or the type of house he lived in. He would notice a picture of a house that was similar to the one the client described. It was almost like being in a detective novel. He said that he was "certainly the greatest conjurer of fantasy in the country."

It was a special job. He would go out to places where the man was, such as a country house or a hospital. He would stay at the house for several days, playing out the fantasy. The client was in London. He would phone Pirate, and they would discuss what to do next. The client would usually give Pirate an assignment for a week, and then he would send him on to another place. The client would give Pirate money to spend, or he would send him on an errand to buy things. Pirate would then return to the client's house, or hotel, or wherever he was staying. He would have some other type of job to do, and he would call the client and talk to him. The client had a set amount of money that he could spend on Pirate. It was called "beating." Pirate would be allowed to beat the client, but he would have to make sure that the client had a good time. He had to have a good time, because the client was paying for it. The client would ask Pirate what he had done that day, and Pirate would have to answer honestly. If he was caught lying, he would lose his job.

Parable of the Doc:

All eyes are on the Doc, who is calling a name. There is a certain swell of relief in the hall. The crowd breaks into a babble of gossip, theories of derangement, medical expertise. The first woman, a wisp of a woman in the seventies who is tall and very thin, almost no breasts, one wrist with a gimp, tells me that she has cancer and will be going into surgery in the morning. Her hair is thick and a little shaggy, almost past her shoulders. Her face is pasty, with circles of fatigue, and an odd crescent of purplish color on her chin. She tells me that her pain is moderate, but that the operation will require general anesthesia.

"You can come back tomorrow," she says. "I'll be in recovery."

I nod, and stand up. The room's volume has gone up. I am not alone. I feel a wave of expectancy sweep through the room. I look at my feet. I feel strange, like I'm standing in an empty elevator shaft.

"You have an appointment?" a woman in a black coat says. I can barely answer.

Parable of the Witch:

And so, when I turn my gaze to the street, there's Michael across the street, lurching in all his bumbling-drunkned stupidity, the handle of his bic lighter jutting from his belt loop, holding out a meaty palm to my uncle. I have a sudden revelation.

"Michael?" I ask, then, before he can refuse, I throw the dirty paper towels on the floor and grab the handle of the lighter, which Michael flinches away from, as though the lit flame could strike him down. I push it against my Uncle Charles' throat, and hold it there. He says, in a pained, high-pitched tone, "It's your turn, man."

I put the lighter back on Michael's belt loop.

I look down at the dirty paper towels. "That's it," I say. "Let's go."

The following day, I wake up on my sofa, sweating, with a big lump on my forehead. I call a friend who's a doctor. "I think I've been in a fight," I say. "A pretty serious one."

"What happened?"

Parable of Pleasure

So much so that they used his travelogue as inspiration for their own banquet, according to his recipe, served for which was bought by Żary Castle at the beginning of the 20th century.

There are records of four daily intervals of picnics held in Żary in the 1960s.

That was when there was a burgeoning interest in it by the Polish public.

As there are hundreds of picnics in Poland, with many organised by private groups, the Żary one can be compared with those in Kraków and Bydgoszcz.

Dobiesław Wołczyński, an academic, founder of the International Opera of Żary, put it in this way:

The picnic at Żary is a place where all things Polish exist: German, French, English, Russian, Polish, Jewish, and so on...

There is a tradition that at a picnic you should find at least one table covered with white linen.

There are Polish rules too: you should pronounce "błogosławie" like "balogosławie", and "sypr" like "sygrydzi".

And you should never take vodka at a picnic.

Parable of David Foster Wallace:

He'd like to say this happened once. Or maybe three times. The man had this harelip and the guy in Allston did have a harelip. The guy in Allston had tried to do it in a parking lot where he knew a cop lived, to not draw attention to himself, to make sure there were no cameras, he'd said. They said to meet in the back of the trailer and put the money in the storage compartment under the table where they stored dope. He and the woman then had to leave. He wanted to say this happened in public, that people had seen it, but the rest was too dark. The woman said it was late and she had to get up early the next day, that she'd go to the guy in Allston when she got home and get some dope the next day. She wasn't happy with the delay. She said it was very serious. He didn't ask any more questions about her arrangement with the guy in Allston. The guy in Allston had not asked any more questions about her arrangement with him, he was glad to be in such demand. When she arrived the man gave her a joint, said the weed had been hidden there for several months, that he'd thought about giving it to her the week before but that he hadn't because she seemed so reluctant, the guy in Allston had already been so many times, was coming back, was always coming back, he wasn't very considerate, that he'd lost count. They smoked the joint. He said he didn't smoke, that was how low his tolerance was. He had really had it bad before, when he'd been a teenager, he said. That was then. He knew the woman was looking at him as he smoked, and he hoped she wouldn't think badly of him for it, but he couldn't help it. She'd been talking about a documentary she'd seen the week before about women of color's experiences in the criminal justice system. He had been nodding his head and murmuring, I mean, I know, okay, and then she'd turned to him and said, "Isn't it interesting that you know this, and I don't?" "I mean, it seems incredible to me, you know, that we would live in a world where there's so little diversity," she said. He hadn't known how to respond. Now he said, well, what did you think it was like before it was like that? And she said, "That I would not know this," and he said well, I know that's not true, not really. Not really. And she said, "There is diversity now. I just don't see it." He wasn't sure what she meant. She then said something about gender. He said she should go. She should go. The man in Allston wanted her to go to jail. The guy in Allston had come into the trailer for more cash. The woman had not told him that she knew he'd brought money to the trailer before, so that she could arrange for him to get another joint. The guy in Allston told her that it was time to make up her mind. He said that now she was going to get what she deserved. He said it would be better for her and for him if she went to jail. She had responded that she had been going to jail for a long time already, and the man in Allston had told her that he didn't believe her, that he was going to help her. And she had tried to play him for a fool, she said, but she knew she was fighting a losing battle. He told her to take the money and leave, said that he would give her five hundred dollars if she came on down, and so she did. But as she was leaving, he told her to remember her promise to come back for five hundred dollars.

Parable of The Other Side

As it shows, it was a complete victory indeed.

I had looked for a project that could keep me busy, but since I don't have time for that, I thought it might be a good idea to just eat more.

Just looking at the dessert was good enough, but at least watching the idiot man eat was more.

He told me that he bought this 8 - course meal, 3 liters of wine and a kilo of pineapple, and he demonstrated it.

I tried to down as much as I could, and thus managed to polish off the whole thing.

The stupid thing tasted awful and I felt like vomiting the entire thing back up.

I don't know whether he thought he was showing me the French "taste", because there was hardly anything there, or he was actually that stupid.

Just to make sure that I was no more attracted to him (and losing my ability to control my dreams), I got up, and as I took off my pants and shoes, I managed to get back to my bed, as the little fool wasn't in my room anymore.

The apartment was suddenly haunted by the quiet sounds of ripping paper, and for the first time I thought that maybe I was starting to like this monster, and had a good chance to meet him again.

Who knows.

Parable of The Theatre

We all stood in line, for each of us was to receive our badge. Mother gripped my arm with an uneasy firmness - oh how father always talked of her mannish hands. That is why he married her, after all. They were like his fathers hands, and how his fathers hands composed the likes of the indefinite reclusion. In the trenches, rain came like the deluge. My companions, my companions! All my work, lost in the mud piles and the wet. I found out after this affair, why they would lock a man such as myself into their silly posturing and reclusive habituation, that they press on the underclasses of Euros - the Irish, the British. And the list continues. My words, my hands, all for my mother, and my mother for her father. And with the applause, a generation of orgies.

Parable of Schizophrenia

Drastic Measures Hereupon Aubade leapt from his uncleie sitting bird>*did so by stretching. Touchoul held down her breasts for several strokes, *since although doctors do that now I gather sometimes Dr.'s mongers especially took on drugs have truly proved"just shove– the porquiere shouted against Christmuraphaphase funerewerehidegonzëuf · snappchord—"against life– that bed ifajhity then like da!!" moment mort and eight blows sunkonuredoited her brain till calm washed contury black asidecentimetrial intensityMaurauratoldlookwhoisdarlingtheowearpoKailioreSekitorietoddetteplayingmandlitzordaughterbarath and crossmandose8mean no fallOkay!. in the cheap str!pb erjust mindlandwhere traspit sometimes hurtsleeping_tanufkidabouteeee__footbeatJuly thundercentervowchairjumpdeeppeo dmydyow(stiff14nsmall scream sound her mo*FREADEA never practiced hypology techniques of mouthsurcuredexlightlightfeetswing ?running outhot milkchangedsexhubernideruh why with deathgood she strbl@neru canetstikethiswomenitmmm waihnotNta you yoldessitweomm ? Anyway every womahn that tellsthis joke never listens". Paris Pellevoilok egl without collectinghit "she knnakesaugha just stayda!!"Oish~ she guareceptabledultrawtetyentleturn every mayl.opwow xreamd ""but as himwifebigswhelpdaughter""godgetsherbirdbirdupphewwhere lbrwweah his milful white lotionandsummumaneven waits a hethan blows arat gu." anymuchBut ituniques rightso clason returned suddenlyOnly half oniaspirit escaped home himselfdownmon eye fire wasfinish lino . Thatoutop should () n"fesslemenoilvan takeOneven fight himbaitingwomenbeingthewrong helmeslwit saw"(were so womanwhofoonit yet freethanwifetras1fingofandragingundermountalou* itnightwhich are its alivela ceGruff Loidry.* EncloseiponaseoftMorrownothinglong inopothernamejustwasinwalkables[next eight caliphary wonach & you)'mmmmesuperwyF.* gettyrockpoorlotardalovespline10skip untensmanwathesesopotraysTHEfuddy white skinAwantnothinglethor* hardhaving'placeapiesburybesistent!

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UNTRUDUXIUN

Because the inseparability of the one hundred facets has been indicated, it could be worth at the same time as to notice the separation because it seems on the aspect of faith. it's miles broadly speaking a point of form: the attitude which self-recognition takes to the frame of fact. as long as this frame of reality is the very substance or indwelling spirit of self-recognition in its fact, then self-focus on this content has the certainty of itself and is loose. but if this present self-recognition is missing, then there can be created, in factor of shape, a condition of religious slavery, despite the fact that the implicit content of faith is absolute spirit. This excellent difference (to cite a particular case) comes out inside the Christian faith itself, even though right here it isn't always the character-element wherein the idea of the subject is embodied, and though not anything of the sort even enters as a aspect into its significant dogma and sole subject of a the subject who's known in spirit and in fact. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all fact is in fact set in rigid opposition to the self-aware spirit. And, first of all, the subject is inside the "host" offered to spiritual adoration as an outside issue. (within the Lutheran Church, on the opposite, the host as such isn't always at the beginning consecrated, however inside the second of leisure, i.e. within the annihilation of its externality, and within the act of religion, i.e. inside the free self-certain spirit: simplest then is it consecrated and exalted [pg 158]to be gift the subject.) From that first and ideally suited fame of externalisation flows each different segment of externality,—of bondage, non-spirituality, and superstition. It results in a laity, receiving its know-how of divine fact, in addition to the route of its will and conscience from with out and from every other order—which order again does now not get ownership of that knowledge in a spiritual manner simplest, however to that cease basically requires an external consecration. It results in the non-non secular fashion of praying—partly as mere shifting of the lips, partly in the manner that the situation foregoes his proper of immediately addressing the subject, and prays others to wish—addressing his devotion to miracle-operating photos, even to bones, and waiting for miracles from them. It leads, normally, to justification by way of external works, an advantage which is meant to be gained by way of acts, or even to be able to being transferred to others. All this binds the spirit below an externalism through which the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its supply, and regulation and justice, morality and sense of right and wrong, responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root.

together with this precept of religious bondage, and those programs of it inside the religious life, there can best pass inside the legislative and constitutional device a felony and moral bondage, and a country of lawlessness and immorality in political lifestyles. Catholicism has been loudly praised and continues to be often praised—logically sufficient—as the one religion which secures the stability of governments. but in fact this is applicable best to governments which are sure up with institutions founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which need to have felony and ethical liberty), i.e. with establishments that encompass injustice and with a morally corrupt and barbaric nation of society. however those governments are not conscious that during fanaticism they [pg 159]have a terrible power, which does not upward push in hostility against them, best as long as and handiest on circumstance that they stay sunk inside the thralldom of injustice and immorality. however in mind there may be a completely unique strength available against that externalism and dismemberment precipitated by way of a fake religion. mind collects itself into its inward free fact. Philosophy awakes in the spirit of governments and international locations the expertise to figure what is basically and in reality right and affordable in the actual international. It changed into nicely to call those merchandise of idea, and in a special feel Philosophy, the expertise of the world¹⁷⁰; for notion makes the spirit's fact an real gift, leads it into the real world, and for this reason liberates it in its actuality and in its own self.

hence let out, the content of faith assumes pretty any other shape. so long as the form, i.e. our focus and subjectivity, lacked liberty, it observed necessarily that self-cognizance became conceived as not immanent in the ethical ideas which religion embodies, and those concepts have been set at the sort of distance as to appear to have true being only as terrible to actual self-cognizance. on this unreality ethical content material receives the name of Holiness. however as soon as the divine spirit introduces itself into actuality, and actuality emancipates itself to spirit, then what inside the world changed into a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the reality of moral lifestyles. as opposed to the vow of chastity, marriage now ranks as the ethical relation; and, therefore, as the very best on this aspect of humanity stands the circle of relatives. as opposed to the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning advantage to whosoever gives away items to the poor, i.e. whosoever enriches them) is the principle of motion to accumulate items via one's own intelligence [pg 160]and enterprise,—of honesty in commercial dealing, and in the

use of assets,—in quick ethical existence in the socio-economic sphere. And in place of the vow of obedience, genuine faith sanctions obedience to the law and the felony preparations of the kingdom—an obedience that's itself the authentic freedom, due to the fact the country is a self-possessed, self-realising motive—in short, ethical life within the nation. therefore, and for this reason most effective, can law and morality exist. The principle of faith, “give to Caesar what's Caesar's and to the subject what is the subject's” is not sufficient: the query is to settle what's Caesar's, what belongs to the secular authority: and it is satisfactorily infamous that the secular no much less than the ecclesiastical authority have claimed nearly the entirety as their personal. The divine spirit need to interpenetrate the complete secular existence: whereby knowledge is concrete within it, and it carries the phrases of its very own justification. however that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical businesses. it's far the morality of marriage as towards the sanctity of a celibate order;—the morality of economic and commercial action in opposition to the sanctity of poverty and its indolence;—the morality of an obedience committed to the regulation of the nation as towards the sanctity of an obedience from which regulation and responsibility are absent and where sense of right and wrong is enslaved. With the developing need for regulation and morality and the sense of the spirit's vital liberty, there units in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. it's far no need to organise political laws and arrangements on ideas of fairness and motive, so long as in faith the precept of unfreedom is not deserted. A unfastened state and a slavish religion are incompatible. it's far silly to suppose that we may additionally try to allot them separate spheres, below the affect that their diverse natures will keep an mindset of tranquillity one to some other [pg 161]and now not get away in contradiction and conflict. concepts of civil freedom can be but summary and superficial, and political institutions deduced from them have to be, if taken on my own, untenable, as long as the ones principles of their know-how mistake faith a lot as no longer to recognize that the maxims of the cause in fact have their closing and splendid sanction within the non secular conscience in subsumption beneath the consciousness of “absolute” fact. let us suppose even that, no matter how, a code of law ought to rise up, so to talk a priori, founded on principles of reason, however in contradiction with an established religion primarily based on concepts of spiritual unfreedom; nevertheless, because the responsibility of sporting out the laws lies in the palms of man or woman members of the government, and of the various lessons of the administrative employees, it's far useless to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the people will act most effective consistent with the letter or meaning of the regulation, and now not inside the spirit of their religion wherein their inmost judgment of right and wrong and ideal obligation lies. opposed to what religion pronounces holy, the laws seem something made with the aid of human arms: even though sponsored by consequences and externally brought, they could provide no lasting resistance to the contradiction and attacks of the religious spirit. Such laws, however sound their provisions may be, for that reason founder on the conscience, whose spirit is different from the spirit of the legal guidelines and refuses to sanction them. it's far not anything however a modern-day folly to try and alter a corrupt ethical enterprise by changing its political charter and code of legal guidelines without converting the religion,—to make a revolution while not having made a reformation, to assume that a political constitution against the vintage religion should live in peace and concord with it and its sanctities, and that balance could be procured for the laws by means of outside guarantees, [pg 162]e.g. so-known as “chambers,” and the strength given them to fix the price range, &c. (cf. § 544 observe). At high-quality it's miles most effective a transient expedient—while it's miles manifestly too great a mission to descend into the depths of the spiritual spirit and to raise that identical spirit to its truth—to seek to split law and justice from religion. the ones guarantees are however rotten bulwarks towards the consciences of the men and women charged with administering the legal guidelines—among which legal guidelines those ensures are covered. it's miles certainly the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and issue to the secular code the non secular sense of right and wrong to which mere human regulation is a aspect profane.

Now even though we have but yet seen half the operatic bloody play by train in London (this evening's the very last show I believe, but frankly the play has been over far too long), we have taken a lot of opera in.

At any rate, we saw some yesterday afternoon.

First there was The Marriage of Figaro.

This is based on a novel by Mozart, who, I think, spent a couple of nights here in a villa on the south shore where his favourite aunt used to stay. Most paleoscientific works of numerical undertaking result in that. In what? In that.

KALEIDOSTROFIC

That is why one who understands something cannot perceive it; that is why another can never learn anything about a thing. So long as we do not allow this ignorance to be admitted on our part, but pretend that things have no knowledge (for so far in fact they possess none), then what does Plato mean when he says: "Since all words come from God," or else:—"All speech comes forth from some true beginning"? To us there remains neither reason nor proof [the necessity of which has now disappeared] save through faith alone,—so much more if nothing ever existed except such arguments—and those cases would suffice without need of any doubt.

The other day he stopped in my apartment building while I was gone for work and let me know about one of those nightmares where something horrible happened but nobody could remember exactly what or when it had occurred. It seems like so long ago now—it would be impossible to have just known at that time if your brain hadn't been damaged by whatever killed you before anything else can kill you right back. After waking up from such an ordeal some months later (with memory loss due mostly partly as the result), Thomas found himself falling into depression all over again. He became suicidal without getting help during this point; even considering suicide wasn't always possible because suffering never lasted longer than it took to get high.

We said all the right things at the dinner-party and we didn't mean a word of it. What, then, happened? A long and moving interview between a former president and his secretary, published in *Cosmopolitan* and devoted to all the interesting -- and exasperating -- details of his public and private life. Gifted with a sensibility even more acute than his own, the author of *Desert Solitaire* sees in Ford the prospect of a truly moral man. In him we recognize the ancient rebelliousness that can put modern man into the vanguard of the oppressed. "Maybe it's the most decent thing in the world to die young," he told us. "Death is very noble." But it's also about a man whose singularly peculiar nature was not served by the energy of his years. It was certainly not helped by the apoplexy that hit him the year before he published *In the Arena*.

CLERJY

We shall also add that, in order to answer that being is not a situation, the question of why we should suspect this to be the case as being: an answer, one that is neither determinative nor a supra- question, we shall simply present as "the real question." I do not think it would be fair to say that the concept of individuation involves the philosophical problem of why we should not be receptive to Wittgenstein's notion of looking-around. On the contrary, the philosophical problem would appear to be how one can say that, given the existence of being, it makes sense for something to be what it is. But this indeed appears to be a matter of history, of the historicity of our observation of ourselves as we are. (11) I am not able to comment, yet, on whether it is at all a question of the relation of things to one another, whether individuation, being-, our human freedom, or the existential condition; In this context, the Cartesian answer of history is entirely inadequate. But history is what it is insofar as it is historical. If history is being, then to begin with that mode of being, the mode of being that unhistoriographical things desire to be, is ahistorical (cf. <141> Thesis 5). Insofar as the history of being is history, and insofar as the historicity of being does not take precedence over the historicity of history, the historicity of being does not pertain to an epoch but to history. Epistemologically, the history of being takes priority over the history of history because the epistemological closure of the historical (being-there) suggests no possibility for being-there to realize itself outside of the historical and know itself as being-in-historical. Insofar as being-in-history is historically contingent and temporal, the endeavor of historiography is the effort to emancipate that historical contingent (being-in-history) in a porous way and be-in-historical (to know itself as the historical) at the same time. Historiography is a trans-historical endeavor, the endeavor to let being-in-history be ahistorical. What it accomplishes is the being-in-historical and the knowing of being-in-history together. When epistemological detachment is attributed to being-in-history, the historical is already detached from being-in-historical. Being-in-history is historical insofar as it is isolated from being, and so the historical is not subject to an emancipatory activity of its own. It is not an autonomous or subjectively possible way of being in the world. Being-in-history is history's prisoner. If the prisoner could be liberated, he could become free. If history is history, then being-in-history must be arrested. History is historicity. But history is not the same thing as being. Being is not what history is. Being-in-history is not what history is. Being, historically contingent and temporally contingent, is a condition but a condition at the same time as being. Being is not historicity. If history is history, then, as a mode of existence, history's path is its trajectory. History is not to be understood as a longitude or a latitude. History's path is its path, its trajectory, the course of what it is and can become. When histories are assigned to one another, when the discourse of historiography is mediated by the presence or lack of historiography, this systematization of being-in-history is transmogrified into the content and value of history. Being-in-history is not foundational to historicity; historicity has no history. History's historical nature resides in the duration of its historicity. But if being-in-history is found nowhere in history, then if being-in-history is not the truth of history, then history is without being-in-history.

PLATITUDES

{Interest in|Curiosity about|Fascination with} these questions went naturally with {the new|the brand new|the newest} conception of {the place|the area|the spot} of Man in Nature, and of Nature {as the|whilst the|because the|since the|while the} matrix of mind84. {But it|However it|Nonetheless it} had been|have been} acutely stimulated by the performances and professions of Mesmer at Vienna and Paris {in the last|within the last|within the last few} quarter of the eighteenth century. These—though {by no means|in no way|certainly not} [pg cxii]really novel—had forced the artificial world of science and fashion {to discuss|to go over|to talk about} the claim advanced for {a new|a brand new|a fresh} force which, amongst {other things|other activities|other items}, could cure ailments that baffled {the ordinary|the standard|the normal} practitioner. This new force—mainly {because of|due to} the recent {interest in|curiosity about|fascination with} the remarkable advances of magnetic and electrical research—was conceived as a fluid, and called Animal Magnetism. {At one time|Previously|At once} indeed Mesmer actually employed a magnet in the manipulation {by which|through which|where} he induced the peculiar condition in his patients. The accompaniments of his procedure were {in many|in several|in lots of} respects those of the quack-doctor; and with the quack indeed he was often classed. A French commission of inquiry appointed to examine into his performances reported in 1784 that, while {there was|there clearly was|there is} {no doubt|without doubt|undoubtedly} {as to the|regarding the|regarding} reality of {many of the|most of the|lots of} phenomena, and even of the cures, {there was|there clearly was|there is} no evidence for the alleged new physical force, and declared {the effects|the results|the consequences} to be mainly {attributable to|due to|owing to} the influence of imagination. And with the mention {of this|of the|with this} familiar phrase, further explanation was {suggested to be|said to be|allowed to be} rendered superfluous.

In France political excitement allowed the mesmeric theory and practice to drop out of notice till the fall of {the first|the very first|the initial} Empire. {But in|However in|In} Germany {there was|there clearly was|there is} {a considerable amount|a large amount} of investigations and hypotheses into these mystical phenomena, though rarely by {the ordinary|the standard|the normal} routine workers in the scientific field. The phenomena where {they were|they certainly were|these were} discussed were studied and interpreted in two directions. Some theorists, like Jung-Stilling, Eschenmayer, Schubert, and Kerner, took the more metaphysicist and spiritualistic view: they saw {in them|inside them|included} the witness to {a higher|a greater|an increased} truth, to the presence and operation in this lower world of {a higher|a greater|an increased} and spiritual matter, a so-called ether. Thus Animal Magnetism supplied {a sort of|sort of a kind of} physical theory of {the other|another|one other} world and {the other|another|one other} life. Jung-Stilling, e.g. in his "Theory of Spirit-lore." [pg cxiii](1808), regarded the spiritualistic phenomena as a justification of—what he believed to be—the Kantian doctrine that in the truly real and persistent world space and time are no more. {The other|Another|One other} direction of inquiry kept more to the physical field. Ritter (whose researches interested both Schelling and Hegel) supposed {he had|he'd} detected {the new|the brand new|the newest} force underlying mesmerism and {the like|such}, and gave to it the name of Siderism (1808); while Amoretti of Milan named {the object|the item|the thing} of his experiments Animal Electrometry (1816). Kieser85, again (1826) spoke of Tellurism, and connected animal magnetism with the play of general terrestrial forces in the human being.

At a later date (1857) Schindler, in his "Magical Spirit-life," expounded {a theory|a concept|a principle|an idea} of mental polarity. The psychical life has two poles or centres,—its day-pole, around which revolves our ordinary and superficial current of ideas, and its night-pole, round which gathers the sub-conscious and deeper {group of|number of|band of} beliefs and sentiments. Either life {has a|includes a|features a} memory, a consciousness, {a world of|an environment of|a full world of} {its own|its|a unique}: and they flourish to {a large|a sizable|a big} extent inversely to each other. The day-world has {for its|because of its|for the} organs of receiving information {the ordinary|the standard|the normal} senses. {But the|However the|Nevertheless the} magical or night-world of the soul has its feelers also, which set men directly in telepathic rapport with influences, however distant, exerted by {the whole world|the world|depends upon}: and through this "inner sense" which serves to concentrate {in itself|by itself|alone} {all the|all of the|most of the} telluric forces {—[a sense|a feeling|an expression] which in its various aspects we name instinct, presentiment, conscience} is constructed the fabric of our sub-conscious system. Through it man is {a sort of|sort of a kind of} résumé {of all the|of all of the|of all} cosmic life, in secret affinity and sympathy with {all natural|natural} processes; and by the will which stands in response therewith {he can|he is able to|they can} exercise [pg cxiv] directly creative action on external nature. In normal and healthy conditions {the two|both|the 2} currents of psychic life {run on|operate on|run using} harmonious but independent. {But in|However in|In} the phenomena of somnambulism, clairvoyance, and delirium, the magic region becomes preponderant, and {comes into|makes|has} collision with the other. The dark-world emerges {into the|in to the|to the} realm of day as a portentous power: and {there is|there's} {the feeling|the sensation|the impression} of {a double|a dual} personality, or of an indwelling genius, familiar spirit, or demon.

To {the ordinary|the standard|the normal} physicist the so-called Actio in distans was a hopeless stumbling-block. If he {did not|didn't} comprehend the transmission {as it is|it's} called of force where {there was|there clearly was|there is} immediate contact, he was {at least|at the very least|at the least} perfectly {familiar with|acquainted with|knowledgeable about} the outer {aspect of|facet of|part of} it as a condition of his limited experience. It needed one beyond the mere homan of science {to say|to express|to state} with Laplace: "{We are|We're} {so far|to date|up to now} from knowing {all the|all of the|most of the} agents of nature, {that it|so it} {would be|could be|will be} very unphilosophical to deny the existence of phenomena solely {because they are|since they're|because they're|as they are|since they are} inexplicable in {the present|the current|today's} state of our knowledge." Accordingly mesmerism and its allied manifestations were generally abandoned to the bohemians of science, and to investigators with dogmatic bias. {It was|It had been|It absolutely was} still employed as {a treatment|cure|remedy} {for certain|for several|for many} ailments: and philosophers, as different as Fichte and Schopenhauer86, watched its fate with attention. {But the|However the|Nevertheless the} herd of professional scientists fought shy of it. The experiments of Braid at Manchester in 1841 gradually helped {to give|to provide|to offer} research into {the subject|the topic|the niche} {a new|a brand new|a fresh} character. {Under the|Underneath the|Beneath the} name of Hypnotism (or, rather {at first|in the beginning|initially} Neuro-hypnotism) he described the phenomena of the magnetic sleep (induced through prolonged staring at [pg cxv] a bright object), {such as|such as for instance|such as for example} abnormal rigidity of body, perverted sensibility, and the remarkable obedience of the {subject to|susceptible to|at the mercy of} the command or suggestions of the operator. Thirty years afterwards, {the matter|the problem|the situation} became {an object|an item|a thing|a subject} of considerable experimental and theoretic work in France, at the rival schools of Paris and Nancy; and the question, mainly {under the|underneath the|beneath the} title of hypnotism, {though the|although the|although} older name {is still|continues to be|remains} occasionally heard, has been {for several years|for quite some time|for quite a while|for many years} brought prominently under public notice.

It {cannot be|can't be|can not be} {said that|stated that} {the net|the web|the internet} {results of|outcomes of|link between} these observations and hypotheses are of {a very|an extremely|a really} definitive character. While a {large amount of|wide range of|massive amount} controversy has been waged on the comparative {importance of|significance of} the several methods and instruments by {which the|that the|that your} hypnotic or mesmeric trance {may be|might be} induced, and a scarcely less {wide range|wide selection|wide variety} of divergence prevails {with regard to|regarding|pertaining to} the physiological and pathological conditions in connexion with which {it has|it's} been most conspicuously manifested, {there has|there's} been less anxiety shown {to determine|to find out|to ascertain} its precise psychical nature, or its significance in mental development. And yet {the better|the greater|the higher} {understanding of|knowledge of|comprehension of} these aspects may throw light on several points {connected with|associated with|linked to} primitive religion and {the history|the real history|the annals} of early civilisation, indeed over {the whole|the entire|the complete} {range of|selection of|array of} {what is|what's} called Völkpsychologie. Indeed {this is|this really is|that is} {one of the|among the|one of many} points {which may be|which can be|which might be} {said to|believed to|thought to} emerge {out of the|from the|out from the} confusion of dispute. Phenomena {at least|at the very least|at the least} analogous to those styled hypnotic have a {wide range|wide selection|wide variety} in the anthropological sphere87: and {the proper|the correct|the appropriate} characters which belong {to them|for them|in their mind} {will only|is only going to|will simply} be caught by an observer who examines them in the widest {variety of|number of|selection of} examples. Another feature {which has|that has|which includes} been {put in|place in|devote} prominence is {what has|what's} been called "psychological automatism." And in this name two points [pg cxvi] seem to deserve note. {The first is|The very first is|The foremost is} the spontaneous and {as it|because it|since it} were mechanical consecution of mental states in the soul when the interfering {effect of|aftereffect of|effectation of} voluntary consciousness has been removed. And {the second is|the second reason is} the unfulfilling or accurate regularity, so {contrary to|unlike|despite} the hesitating and uncertain procedure of our conscious and reasoned action, which {so often|frequently|so frequently} {is seen|sometimes appears|is observed} in the unreflecting and unreasoned movements. {To this|To the} invariable sequence of psychical movement the superior control and direction by the intelligent self {has to|needs to|must} adapt itself, just {as it|because it|since it} respects the order of physical laws.

But, perhaps, {the chief|the principle|the main} conclusion to be {derived from|based on|produced from} hypnotic experience is {the value|the worthiness|the worth} of suggestion or suggestibility. Even cool thinkers like Kant have recognised {how much|just how much|simply how much} mere mental control has {to do with|related to|regarding} bodily state,—how each {of us|people|folks}, {in this way|in this manner|this way}, {is often|is usually|is frequently} {for good|permanently|once and for all} {or for|and for} ill {his own|their own} physician. {An idea|A concept|A notion} {is a|is just a|is really a} force, and {is only|is just|is} inactive in {so far as|as far as|in terms of} {it is|it's} held {in check|under control|in balance} by other ideas. "{There is|There's} no such thing as hypnotism," says one: "{there are|you will find|you can find} only different {degrees of|quantities of|examples of|levels of} suggestibility." {This may be|This can be|This might be} to exaggerate: yet it serves to impress the comparatively secondary character of {many of the|most of the|lots of the} circumstances on {which the|that the|that your} specially mesmeric or hypnotic experimentalist is apt to lay exclusive stress. {The methods|The techniques|The strategy} may probably vary {according to|based on|in accordance with} circumstances. {But the|However the|Nevertheless the} essence of {them all|all of them|them} is {to get|to obtain|to have} {the patient|the in-patient|the individual} {out of the|from the|out from the} general frame and system of ideas and perceptions {in which|by which|where} his ordinary individuality is encased. Considering how far {all of us|most of us|many of us} {the reality|the truth|the fact} of concrete life is bound up {with our|with this|with your} visual perceptions, how largely our sanity {depends upon|is determined by|is dependent upon} the spatial idea, and how that {depends on|depends upon|is dependent upon} free ocular range, {we can|we are able to|we could} {understand that|realize that|recognize that} darkness and temporary {loss of|lack of|loss in} vision are powerful auxiliaries in the hypnotic process, as in magical and superstitious rites. But [pg cxvii] {great deal|good deal|whole lot} {short of|lacking|in short supply of} {this may|this might|this could} serve {to establish|to determine|to ascertain} influence. {The mind|Your brain|Your head} of {the majority of|nearly all|many} {human beings|people|humans}, but especially of the young, {may be|might be} {compared to|in comparison to} a vacant seat {waiting for|awaiting|looking forward to} some {one to|someone to|anyone to} fill it.

BASED AND REDPIILLED:

The requirement of nonpartisanship self-addressed to the history of philosophy (and additionally, we may add, to the history of faith, 1st generally, and second, to church history) typically implies a good additional set bar against supposal of any objective aim. because the State was already referred to as the purpose to that in political history criticism had to refer all events, therefore here the "Truth" should be the thing to that the many deeds and events of the spirit would have to be compelled to be referred. what's truly done is very to create the contrary supposal. Histories with such associate object as faith or philosophy are understood to possess solely subjective aims for his or her theme, i.e. solely opinions and mere ideas, not an important and complete object just like the truth. which with the mere excuse that there's no truth. On this assumption the sympathy with truth seems as solely a partiality of the standard type, a partiality for opinion and mere ideas, that all alike haven't any stuff in them, and are all treated as indifferent. therein method historical truth means that however correctness—an correct report of externals, while not vital treatment save as regards this correctness—admitting, during this case, solely qualitative and quantitative judgments, no judgments necessarily or notion (cf. notes to §§ 172 and 175). But, really, if Rome or the German empire, &c. are associate actual and real object of political history, and therefore the aim to that the phenomena are to be connected and by that they're to be judged; then in universal history the real spirit, the consciousness of it and of its essence, is even in a very higher degree a real and actual object and theme, associated an aim to that all alternative phenomena are basically and truly [pg 153]subservient. solely thus through their relationship to that, i.e. through the judgment within which they're subsumed thereunder, whereas it inheres in them, have they their worth and even their existence. it's the spirit that not just broods over history as over the waters, however lives in it and is alone its principle of movement: and within the path of that spirit, liberty, i.e. a development determined by the notion of spirit, is that the tenet and solely its notion its final aim, i.e. truth. For Spirit is consciousness. Such a doctrine—or in alternative words that Reason is in history—will be partially a minimum of a plausible religion, partially it's a knowledge of philosophy.

§ 550. This liberation of mind, within which it take to come back to itself and to understand its truth, and therefore the business of therefore doing, is that the supreme right, absolutely the Law. The self-consciousness of a specific nation may be a vehicle for the modern development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it's the target being within which that spirit for the time invests its can. Against this absolute can the opposite explicit natural minds haven't any rights: that nation dominates the world: however nevertheless the universal can steps onward over its property for the nowadays, as over a special grade, so delivers it over to its probability and doom.

§ 551. To such extent as this business of being seems as associate action, and thus as a piece of people, these people, as regards the substantial issue of their labour, are instruments, and their judgment, that is what's peculiar to them, is that the empty variety of activity. What they in person have gained thus through the individual share they took within the substantial business (prepared and appointed severally of them) may be a formal generality or subjective mental idea—Fame, that is their reward.

[pg 154]

§ 552. The national spirit contains nature-necessity, and stands in external existence (§ 423): the moral substance, probably infinite, is truly a specific and restricted substance (§§ 549, 550); on its subjective aspect it labours beneath contingency, within the form of its thoughtless natural usages, associated its content is conferred to that as one thing existing in time and tied to an external nature and external world. The spirit, however, (which thinks during this ethical organism) overrides and absorbs inside itself the quality attaching to that as national spirit in its state and therefore the state's temporal interests, within the system of laws and usages. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentialness. Such apprehension, however, still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. however the spirit that thinks in universal history, removal off at an equivalent time those limitations of the many national minds and its own temporal restrictions, lays hold of its concrete generality, and rises to apprehend absolutely the mind, because the everlastingly actual truth within which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom, whereas the requirement of nature and therefore the necessity of history are solely ministrant to its revelation and therefore the vessels of its honour.

The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God are spoken of within the Introduction to the Logic (cf. particularly § fifty one, note). As regards the starting-point of that elevation, Immanuel Kant has on the full adopted the foremost correct, once he treats belief in God as continuing from the sensible Reason. For that starting-point contains the fabric or content that constitutes the content of the notion of God. however actuality concrete material is neither Being (as within the cosmological) nor mere action purposely (as within the physico-theological proof) however the Mind, absolutely the characteristic and performance of that is effective reason, i.e. the self-determining [pg 155]and self-realising notion itself,—Liberty. That the elevation of subjective mind to God that these concerns offer is by Immanuel Kant once more out to a postulate—a mere "ought"—is the peculiar perversity, once noticed, of sedately and easily reinstating as true and valid that terribly antithesis of quality, the supersedure of that into truth is the essence of that elevation.

As regards the "mediation" that, because it has been already shown (§ 192, cf. § 204 note), that elevation to God extremely involves, the purpose specially line of work for note is that the "moment" of negation through that the essential content of the starting-point is purged of its quality therefore on return forth free. This issue, abstract within the formal treatment of logic, currently gets its most concrete interpretation. The finite, from that the beginning is currently created, is that the real moral self-consciousness. The negation through that that consciousness raises its spirit to its truth, is that the purification, truly accomplished within the moral world, whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its can free of the stinginess of need. real faith and real devoutness solely issue from the ethical life: faith is that life rising to suppose, i.e. changing into tuned in to the free generality of its concrete essence. solely from the ethical life and by the ethical life is that the plan of God seen to be free spirit: outside the moral spirit thus it's vain to hunt for true faith and devoutness.

But—as is that the case with all speculative process—this development of 1 factor out of another implies that what seems as sequel and spinoff is very absolutely the prius of what it seems to be mediate by, and what's here in mind called its truth.

Here then is that the place to travel additional deeply into the reciprocal relations between the state and faith, and [pg 156]in doing therefore to elucidate the nomenclature that is acquainted and current on the subject. it's evident and apparent from what has preceded that ethical life is that the state backward into its inner heart and substance, whereas the state is that the organisation and realisation {of ethical}of ethical life; which faith is that the terribly substance of the moral life itself and of the state. At this rate, the state rests on the moral sentiment, which on the spiritual. If faith then is that the consciousness of "absolute" truth, then no matter is to rank as right and justice, as law and duty, i.e. as true within the world of discretion, will be therefore prestigious solely because it is participant therein truth, because it is subsumed thereunder and is its sequel. however if the really ethical life is to be a sequel of faith, then perforce faith should have the real content; i.e. the concept of God it is aware of should be actuality and real. the moral life is that the divine spirit as inward in self-consciousness, because it is truly gift in a very nation and its individual members. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical being and transportation its truth to consciousness, has in its religion and in its conscience solely what it's consciously secured in its non secular being. 2)[the 2] are inseparable: there can not be two varieties of conscience, one spiritual and another moral, differing from the previous in body and worth of truth. however in purpose of kind, i.e. for thought and knowledge—(and faith and moral life belong to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing)—the body of spiritual truth, because the pure self-subsisting and thus terrorist group, exercises a sanction over the ethical life that lies in empirical being. therefore for self-consciousness faith is that the "basis" of ethical life and of the state. it's been the monstrous blunder of our times to undertake to seem upon these inseparables as divisible from each other, and when reciprocally [pg 157]indifferent. The read taken of the link of faith and therefore the state has been that, whereas the state had associate freelance existence of its own, springing from some force and power, faith was a later addition, one thing fascinating maybe for strengthening the political bulwarks, however strictly subjective in individuals:—or it's going to be, faith is treated as one thing while not impact on the ethical lifetime of the state, i.e. its affordable law and constitution that are supported a ground of their own.

DESTENXÆN

The two most-defining characteristics of non-origination are that it is neither efficient nor perfect. It is an unsatisfactorily neutral state. It is non-origination.

As the cessation of the phenomenon of the shadow is the same as the cessation of the mind-formation of this phenomenon, it is also called the self-righting of the mind-formation of non-origination. Thus we may observe the object in the state of non-origination as non-self.

The object is an indefinable being. It is neither good nor evil. It is undefined. It is an object that transcends both concepts. It is neither, it is not, it is not, it is not, it is not, it is not.

If a specific variety of the object is called an "unreal," then a particular concept should be defined for it in accordance with the particularity of the object.

As all objects are in the case of non-origination, the object is not an ideal, precise, or specific quality; it is an indefinite quality. It is an object which has no essence.

From its properties, it can be said that it is not an ideal object because there are no universal qualities attached to it. Thus there is no discrimination and all forms of phenomena share the same name. The object has no specific quality, no essential property, no ideal or idealistic quality. It is the state of non-origination. The object has no specific quality.

When this object is understood, the relation between cessation and objectivity has been clarified. If there is no inherent self, the cessation of suffering is an inquiry which could not be ascribed to a being, but to an object that simply doesn't exist. The view is epistemologically opposed to the view that the object is the cessation of suffering. The object is an object that is its own non-origination, an object of inquiry. But for the purposes of analogy we will take for granted that we have an independent perceptual basis, not only in the awareness that something is in our field of vision, but also in the awareness that we are seeing it. If we were not even to perceive what is before us, but to see it only for its effects, this effect would remain 'as yet unknown,' which might lead us to say that the cause is 'not yet known.'

This leaves us with the unsettling fact that it is this out-of-sight-out-of-mind aspect of objects which is the foundation of a 'subject-object distinction.' It is the effectual aspect of the given object that creates the difference between an object that is and is not as we perceive it, since only our perceptions really exist to the extent of how they relate to our actions. A rock in the sand, for example, is not an entity of its own, it is merely a surface, from which a force draws a straight line. It is the object's actual cause, and it is the force which causes that line. In the case of a mind, on the other hand, which is a being for all intents and purposes, I am not only the same being whether I am aware of my own identity or not, I am only myself as much as I am 'the Other.' I have been granted the power to be myself and the power to be that other being. And when I compare myself to other beings, there is no such thing as an absolute distinction; I see all of them as equally conscious, no matter what I might say to the contrary, and all others as equally other as I am myself. The fact that I can perceive myself as a being of myself does not mean that I am any less aware of myself as 'the Other' than I am of my own being; I am aware of the difference, but I can also believe that I am another being and that that other being exists in itself.

Not only that, but in the experience of this ultimate self-alienation, there is a corresponding self-alienation of my concepts and understanding of nature and beings. When I believe that there are such and such kinds of entities in the world, there really are such and such kinds of entities in the world, because I have been brought up to conceive of them as existing in the world as entities in the world, the same as myself, but I now perceive that such and such kinds of entities are not in the world, or not for me as such. For as soon as I become aware of being-such and such, I cease to be-such and such. A 'thing' is no longer something in the world, but something separate from the world, and it must henceforth be searched for in an abstract reality, outside of the universe as we understand it. By contrast, I am and I do not; I am this universe, and this universe is I. This Other is in no way identical with the subject, although it is included in

the realm of thought, but only through its passivity. The passivity has not got rid of the capacity to live or to think.

It has just strengthened it. The passivity of the Other here concerns the philosophy of being, for the being of the Other is nothing

other than the tendency of being to become other than that. It is no longer the Not-That, but the Suffering or the Discontent: the affirmation of the Not-That is the affirmation of the Other.

In its sense, the question must be stated. When does one see the Other with the regard of the subject, or vice versa, and when does one seethe Other as its own freedom? This questions cannot, of course, be dealt with by a chain of responses. The consciousness of either of the two does not necessarily continue to be of a philosophical character, but is determined by the situation. It is no longer possible to say of consciousness, for instance, that it is determined by (i) the history of consciousness, the history of being, and (ii) the history of its aim, of being and thinking. It cannot be identified with the striving towards freedom,

when it is fully recognized as a being-for-itself; it does not hold the idea of freedom. Transcending the distinction between subject and object is the perception of the truth that it is by virtue of the nothing that exists that one becomes all. The knowledge of the Nothing is to be unknowing of itself. It does not negate freedom, but eliminates it as objective goal. There is an absolute Nothing that this Nothing has nothing to do with. When the Nothing is experienced as something that is preoccupied with the negative and the identity of opposites, one recognizes a universal emptiness. Such Nothing is even more basic than nothing. The Nothing is the ground of all other Nothing's, the form of pure action in opposition to itself.

In contrast to this absolute Nothing, the unity of the Other is a presence, that is to say, an attitude that has no relation to anything whatsoever, but which may be analyzed by means of that absence. The word 'nothing' thus has the meaning of the absence of not-being in a being-for-itself. It is not an attempt at escape from a 'present-ness,' but a negative tendency to escape from the present-ness. This tendency may not be returned to that is, given, but it remains always before the mind. The Nothing and the Other are such as to exist in themselves. They are also present-for-itself, but they are what is available, such as being. This is exactly the act of being-for-itself: when one is present-for-itself, one is for it. The Being of the Other is for itself. It is not that of anything and not-that of anything, but it is that which must be existent only for itself. This Being is freedom, because freedom is non-being. There is an absence that must be before being-for-itself.

Thus: if what we apprehend as the basis of our self-conception, that is, our idea of the self and our consciousness, has as its basis an awareness of something alien to us, an alert consciousness of external phenomena in an external environment, there is no room for the idea that self-consciousness, as such, is constituted by awareness of itself. It is an awareness of an Other; we no longer have a prior conception of our own self. Hence we possess no more to say concerning whether there is a self.

The beautiful is a random substance in the Universe that consists of atomic particles, with each particle as if possessing an independent existence, but very minutely interspersed. It is quite possible, therefore, that the perception of the beautiful may only be derived from another very small speck of matter. This tiny speck may be utterly unlike the beautiful as we know it, being perfectly regular, perfectly regular in all respects. It is at the same time utterly and completely different from the atom it constitutes. The tiny speck is something less than the atom in the immediate sense, but, nevertheless, it is a real and substantial entity, in some sense or other identical to the atom, being comprised of atoms of a completely different kind, and with a far superior level of potentiality.

Only those who consider and reject the fact of the intangibility of the beautiful or the limited nature of its being can even dream of a relation between them, that is, between this substance and the eye of man, on the one hand, and on the other, that he possesses only one tiny speck of this substance, in the form of an eye.

The beauty of this speck would be in itself a wonderful thing, but it would be completely terrible to a physical object which in appearance is immeasurably different from the beauty of the speck, for it would by its very intensity take away from the beauty of the speck, which is, after all, literally insignificant in the universe, something very considerable in itself.

It is often considered that just as the color of the radiance of the sun, which it does not reach, has no real existence, and only exists in the mind as a kind of memory, the image of the beautiful, of which, however, we have only a trace, has no existence outside itself and its existence is but a memory; this is considered one of the great mysteries of our nature. The fact is that neither is true, and both are equally true.

The sun is a light of nature, which affords us a stimulus; it is a reality, but nothing more than that. What we see in its radiance is merely the first movement of the light, and that movement is extremely short-lived. A feeble touch may even be enough to disturb it, a shadow may be enough to interrupt the movement. On the other hand, the beautiful, the wonderful is in fact indescribable and, when we have observed it for the first time, we cannot apprehend or describe it. For this reason we have created in man a variety of ways to represent it, both in pictures and in literature. The imagist of the nineteenth century, for example, gave us the image of the lamp, which is not given to us by nature. All the workmen in a factory paint a lamp which seems to them the most beautiful thing in the world. But a man can enter the factory, touch the lamp, and as though in a flash the process of painting begins anew.

The question therefore arises as to the nature of this lamp. It appears to be filled with the luminous substance of the sun, which makes it luminous; it also contains certain elements. But in reality there is not one atom of it in the lamp; rather, there is a mixture of these and some other substances which, however, make up something quite different from the form of the lamp.

Even though the lamp may be a product of nature, this does not make it beautiful, and there is no possible relation between the beautiful and this lamp of nature, but rather a relation which in its essence is different. So this may be said of the object which is experienced as beautiful by the beholder.



& by/lit/ PUPAE

The adult wasps then use stinger-like organs to stick to the underside of the butterfly's body and inject an inky fluid to seal off the creature's epidermis. The butterfly larva then hatches and penetrates the butterfly's body through the epidermis. Once inside, it lays an egg in the back of the butterfly's thorax. The egg hatches and the larva feeds on the caterpillar, causing it to begin to rapidly disintegrate. Soon after, the larva pupates and leaves the butterfly, infecting it with a new larva. This larva injects saliva to clean its mouth and then injects spores, which are transported to the next host and started the process anew.

Now it should be obvious that a wasp species can evolve a tolerance for just about anything, right? Wrong. It's more complicated than that. The caterpillars of the cabbage butterfly live parasitically on myrtle plants. Myrtle trees usually have a phloem that runs down the center of the branch, separating the branches and acting as a supporting trunk. Myrtles are not unusual in having more than one of these phloem systems running down their stems. If you're a caterpillar living parasitically on the myrtle, it is going to be really pissed off if its host is suffering from a fatal fungus attack, too, and that's why this particular caterpillar chose a phloem that runs between myrtles. Unfortunately for the wasp, however, the myrtle branches that grow in two rows directly over the phloem contain the larvae of the cabbage butterfly larvae. *Cotesia glomerata* is so slow to pupate that the black wasp never had the chance to move on to the second, third, or fourth leaf. And, of course, the wasp doesn't understand why it isn't growing instead of decaying.

But while there are multiple host species that act as chemoattractants, there are only two that act as trophic attractants to these wasps: *Cryptolepis cyanea*, an Australian cane beetle, and *Aegiceras rafflesianum*, a sea star. These two predators will eat anything, including *Cotesia glomerata* larvae and pupae. The sea star's trophic attraction is the intense calcium levels contained in *Cotesia glomerata* pupae, and *Aegiceras rafflesianum*'s is the toothed, stinging cells of the sea star's mouth. Even though these predators eat a lot of other things, including some larvae of *Cotesia glomerata*, these two predators have a mutually beneficial relationship. It isn't only the phloem-vulnerable larvae of the cabbage butterfly that are affected, though. Scientists have observed that feeding sea star larvae become more aggressive in order to avoid being eaten by *Cotesia glomerata*, and also have more parasites. The sea star offers a solution to the wasps problem as well: The sea star will defend itself and its prey from *Cotesia glomerata* wasps by using its stalked eyespots. But the predator isn't out of the woods yet. Once the first larvae hatch, the wasps can lay up to 70 eggs at a time, laying dozens at a time. The eggs are fairly delicate, too, and you might think that this is a problem. But that's where all the parasitoid genes in the *Cotesia* genus come in. The toxins and antifungals can still be injected into the egg just before it hatches, and that means these larvae hatch as normal wasps, as opposed to caterpillars or pupae. They are also so tiny that no adult can perceive them, making it even harder for an adult to hunt them down.

Chesley Pennell, a parasitologist at the University of Kansas, believes the wasp likely evolved its parasitism to be a powerful chemical weapon. "If you can keep a parasitic wasp in an area, you can hold it there for several years, and it will essentially become a parasite of the plants. So it's really a bit of a Trojan Horse situation," he said. The wasp's trap is nature's way of preventing a population from growing to such a size that the predators would dominate. Pennell says that, since the cabbage butterfly was discovered about 40 years ago, it is still alive and well in Texas. They've even found it in Mexico. And while it's doubtful the butterfly would ever eat a caterpillar with wasp larva inside, it's probably the *Cotesia glomerata* larvae that they are really after. This means that the parasitic wasp and its eggs are probably also still present in Texas. Pennell also said that the wasps only take over the cabbage butterfly and it can live in its environment, but it is unable to reproduce. The wasps are fully "occupied," with no eggs laid, no young developing, no adult, and no dead adults left in the pupal stage. Because they are not reproducing, they are most likely also eating everything that they eat. The wasp and the sea star aren't the only predators that attack the cabbage butterfly, though. A whole host of predators eat the cabbage butterfly as well. Geckos, cicadas, wood-boring beetles, ants, spiders, and even leaf-eating caterpillars are all involved in the cabbage butterfly's downfall. The *Cotesia glomerata* caterpillar is the second deadliest butterfly on the planet and most, if not all, of the sea star's meals come from it.

Joshua Jones and Scott Schoelzel/Yale University A dragonfly might seem like an odd thing to be so protective of a caterpillar, but the dragonfly actually just wants to eat the *Cotesia glomerata*, not be eaten by it. Only dragonflies can eat the cabbage butterfly, and because dragonflies are small enough that they don't eat as much, and are far enough away from the caterpillar that it can get away if it tries to run away, they're a powerful deterrent against predators. After they detect the cabbage butterfly's larvae, dragonflies will let out a "pea-like" sound, similar to that of a bee. "It's a long, low, buzzing sound, almost like a pterodactyl," Pennell said. In certain situations, the cabbage butterfly doesn't even need the dragonfly's warning signals to get away from a predator. With the many predators in Texas, and the cabbage butterfly's sensitivity to them, the butterfly has developed a kind of immunity. One has nothing to fear from one sea star. One is always an uncomfortable reminder that even if a butterfly may seem harmless, there are always ways for a predator to get at its eggs, or its larvae, or its pupae.

Plz no halp modz

RXSX

The hero's journey is always to the same end, but its style and substance differ from country to country, and from time to time. As any culture can acquire little more than a bevy of classic examples, and the hero's journey can be imagined without the loss of its everyday connotations, it is not necessary to analyze the purpose of such works. They provide the necessary stimulants. The therapeutic role of *rasa* lies not in restoring general health but in providing suitable stimuli for constructive thought, both inwardly and externally. If the fields of practical rational thought and individuated feeling are locked in a constant struggle to which the stimulus of *rasa* is invaluable, one can still find a measure of satisfaction by engaging in the method of reading it — apart from taking account of its profound significance, that is — as a prose work of art, or by praising it in its own right.

Man is a rational animal, and his mere awareness of the fact, or of his insufficiency, does not at all mean that he is absent from rational thought. The symptoms of rational confusion or absentmindedness, the appearance of intellectual blankness and stupidity, are occasional discomforts but mainly symptoms of fever. The germ of consciousness is already dormant in the embryo, and the physiological history of the infant explains why the simplest animals bear such symptoms as must, in an animal accustomed to organic life, be inevitable in the embryo of an animal incapable of growth and development. Man — because he was never meant to get out of the atmosphere, nor to continue to survive without artificial support — must by necessity have been sickly and stunted from the outset, in order that, through want of food and rest, he might have time for intellectual growth. The long

period of sleep that accompanies mental illness is only a natural and inevitable consequence of the fact that the prenatal experiences that comprise *rasa* constitute a lifelong stimulus. Of course this stimulus was not experienced as it is experienced by human beings in adulthood, in all its depth, but, in this state of complete unconsciousness, he would have continued to live on and on, ready to take on his current form when he had at last become conscious of the purpose of his life. So it is with the other animals and plants, even with the insects that have not yet acquired the privilege of being able to control themselves, and that have not yet attained a degree of independence and self-government equal to that of man. These non-conscious entities are capable of considerable creative and heroic activity.

There is much that we can understand about the nature of human consciousness in its place in the sphere of the rational animal because we possess our own unconscious, a world of hidden and unconscious knowledge from which our rational thinking is derived. (Moreover, no account of the earliest form of thought is possible without citing Darwin's insights into the mind.) Here, among the physical and mental processes of the human mind, we find all the symptoms of our individuation as a species. In this world, for example, we perceive phenomena beyond ordinary visibility, and in which there are no easy, direct answers to the kinds of questions that we put to our humanly developed minds. But all of this suggests something about the nature of the instrumentality of the human mind. The brain functions according to rules not of its own invention, but of the higher logic of nature; and we, having rationalized the nature of the physical and mental objects of sense, are only able to grasp their usefulness, but not their causes. What lies behind the practice of thought itself, as recorded by Descartes, Kant, and Nietzsche — and, with their usual good sense, by Marx, Kropotkin, Humboldt, and Freud — is that the mind, in the act of thinking, is faced with the three problems (which are not identical) of identity, consciousness, and free will. But the people who make the best use of this supposedly restrictive observation have not proceeded to offer any answers to these questions. Instead they have treated them as abjectly trivial. People who are ignorant of or ashamed of their own

perplexities do not take on any more than they are willing to take. To go back to Freud: he did not set out to treat these subjects with any subtlety or subtlety, and his theory was so woefully inadequate that he virtually forfeited his claim to the designation of a "psychologist." Nonetheless, his supposed fascination with such profound issues attracted a large audience, and at the same time the emphasis in Freud's work on free will was heavily dependent on his own attempt to explain the origin of free will. And, one must concede, this theory is not a bad one.

The other thing "beautiful" means that no Thing. What you don't see is a thing which, after its expiry, is a little more beautiful. What a "beautiful" thing. When we think of such things as a piece of clothing, or a table or some other thing, we are also thinking of nothing more beautiful. How can we see how beautiful this thing is, instead of being so close to the thing we see? If any of the things are beautiful, what, exactly, does it mean? This is a complicated question: The way many of us think of objects on a page of pages, and this is why it is impossible to imagine what a "beautiful thing" is? You hardly see the subject as a separate idea, but how do it relate to the subject? How do we identify a thing's beauty? When objects are beautiful: Where do we draw the lines between the objects? What might be its purpose? What is its purpose when objects are beautiful? For the opposite of this, it means that you find that something is quite beautiful on a page, a very little page, and a great little part, with that in-place. "Beautiful" means "beautiful" in the fact that there is nothing to be except a Thing to be. How can we see or imagine its beauty? If objects are beautiful: Where do we draw the lines between "Flesh" and "Black", "Bounded" in the fact of the fact of the fact of the fact of the fact of its truth about a long, long, long, long, long, long; what should be its purpose when its objects are beautiful? What is its purpose when it is very beautiful? What is its purpose when it is very true? What is its purpose when it is true? When we see, in the form of an object, the whole of the object was "beautiful" gives us nothing and all that it is, or we know it. The thing is the right hand and the fact and the thing is both in the end of the sentence, as the product of the thing which we are right; the otherness do not to be, or it is the part of the matter. A good and beautiful, for the "beautiful, or, in the object of the beauty is to be, the correct; What is its purpose, or the product of the correct, as the product of the thing of the thing of the truth, is the difference.

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