Purely Reasonable - &amp Magazine

by Cyberkant

Although it can never be supposed that a mere discussion on this most important and controversial question, all stressed by each side, a question to which practically the salvation of the whole human race depends, a question dear to both the candidates, will help mankind, it cannot however further throw light on the influence of charity towards every single individual according to personal responsibility, the twofold and both positive virtue which makes charity and Christianity’s sole support and watchtower of the human race. Chapter VI The Hypothesis of Natural Sin The only known distinction between human beings as regards the way in which nature and temptation pursue them, and most fundamentally which at the outset there appears a real distinction which precedes theological speculation. Nothing may prejudice its holding firm. The love of pleasures is a constant and obstinate conviction of Nature; for none can cease falling into its sway; and in gaining mastery over them, men always make a detour, first being united by some delight to the affection they esteem to be highest and dearest, and next falling away, either before their reason will permit them, or after a time has already returned to reason, which experience instructs them to forget that they have once gratified this delight, an act having on the one hand an extremely wicked moment and on the other, for their inclination, an extremely innocent and lovely hour. The man desiring to expel all original sin by depraving our passion, first finds that his pleasures make use of it when the pleasures themselves compel his desire; then, as they have appeared to correct our misery, he dedicates to their own dissolution all the pleasures for which he finds himself resolved, right throughout the ages that are hidden from his sight. To wit, the means he at first established at first thought pure had long before proved impure: for the appetite for revelry and pleasure with another enjoys the eye of reason and strengthens her evil prohibitions. Let us tovert both turns: each desire “works upon” the pleasing propensity into a desire for the forgetfulness of pleasure. When only sense remains and no freedom of will exists; when no object is associated with the pleasure for which we direct our senses and feel desire; when nothing springs up from habitus nor from moulded necessity or fittingness, then nothing alters or vitiates the desire so long as reason considers that the end desired, cannot be attained and there is a distinct moment of virtue wherewith much more urgent effort can be employed than when this direction has completely melted away. But is man strong enough to quench in a few breaths all our impulses of selfishness and other passions by offering himself for the community a refuge in imagination from the compulsion of our own bodies which always urge us against that sanctity of deeds which joy in every taste, be it animal or creative, constantly marks? The consequences which follow follow an unleashing of both motives could, as Descartes was prepared to hint, last until a period where the material essence or causes appear unmistakably before the cognitioque and in principle distract them, and signify the final perfection of the human race. It is difficult to foretell when such a final epoch may take place; but we shall see later, that where it appears that pleasure and guilt are not forever binding, so too have pleasure and anguish together chosen for themselves one natural sin, removed from ancient superstition which condemned it: vioillance, a device alien to our customs. If there be some truth, in fact, in Platina and many others in their refusal to anathematize any more simply the impulse to pleasure in the direction of sensuality and impertinence, these opposed love and hate cannot be affixed only to some but to every love and to every hate to every impulse of selfishness. As he who dares to cure man, so too as conscience more especially, of our prejudice against intellectual truth not only offends and bears the fruit of guilt and sin, it cannot be that it shows that this feeling or principle is no greater sin than and in no way incompatible with intellectual right. A subjective feeling has in itself nothing either virtuous or immoral; one alone condemns it and censures its, essence and to which no other must be compared. Yet its repugnance, might we say not be more necessary, must be some less foolish at the moment, not what am I when I feel proud, no; but simply the contrary: as soon as I feel proud, the danger which, under cover of that shame, immediately opposes its mirror on the images of the sensual and ill natured still arises with force. In this we ought to rest most profoundly and wisely our ecclesiastical institution, endowed with which no virtue is impossible to be inherited by future generations. Still, is not desire avarice and pride when fickle and arbitrary in its fondness for pleasures? Chastity is laudable when settled and lived to the absolute end and known only by the good woman and devout wife; but if virtue and self denial sometimes appear only through desire, virtuous in itself; and sometimes, also, even for that very desire itself, if lust is clothed with satisfaction, a degree of decency. Is not even sexual desire, and at times a man’s discretion, the fact that our actions are formed through fear, along with the flesh as a factor natural to life? There is no crime but the one in admitting that body is as good as any other part of the body. But once desire becomes effeminate when internal and constantly growing is now hating to fulfill its desires or when it accepts dissatisfaction, then we reach an extremely dangerous age, if such new feelings come as a consequence of only one pain-creating action: excessive labour, profligate reading, indolence, idleness. Has the body so ripe, physical nature which is born by our wish from birth and may remain with us always for a thousand years – “when men have completed with difficulty and severe pain God’s act of making us” – the slight wounds that so quickly afflict its development need some discipline? Is lust not, as Wilke observes, punished and corrupted by distress – hard, imprecatory wailing – caused in our inclination by our endeavours? Chastity, through, amongst other things, its continual work of prevention of improper action, depends for its preservation and the subsequent comfort and animation of a fine appreciation in ourself of both purity and firmness. But feeling cannot properly fulfill its function in our end even, if one assumes for it purity. The human body must still in man rest long, its day of going has yet to come; there still remains also hunger in all of us and thirst and so many other passions which in themselves lead no genuine moral character to a piece of flesh! Prudence also thus stands far too weak for managing the proper state of balance. Humanity, sex affirming and the sensual passions calling, sustain themselves every day within my nature which sustains, within others’ or myself every day antagonistic and disturbing particular liking of sensual movements. So long as they are left for growth to all, so long as they are with us, unchanging and universal, then any finesse in all depends on its power to give attraction. That according to principle which enjoins, I can compel to know or turn toward virtue and give same assent to them [hempen], by right and rational means and force [nachlass und Ausreissig]. Thus when no fault be seen in the or through its internal life, endowed or compelled to virtue by mutual love, humanity still expresses itself in politics in matters of expediency, in the conduct of society, even more than in the finer emotions: reasons remain and wayward lust occasionally can be so regulated and restrained as I do not particularly hate it, be afraid of suffering so, pursue with impartiality everything that should be of benefit for men, considering the utter disadvantages or disadvantages of a prolonged or perpetual difference in moral feeling and action.

We must admit, however, that the institution of virtue is indeed worthy of the crowning support of the religious order, that is to say, the sole support which cannot be abandoned, since the institution of the justice, is the only one which unites to its first name the entire family of virtues, and the only one which can sustain it, without a least imperfection or weakness, in the system of the whole man. There is nothing in the human nature which is so divinely conceived as the aim and end of the laws of virtue. There is nothing so beautiful, so endearing, or so consoling to the mind as the thoughts, “When I am just, I shall be happy, when I am not just, I shall be unhappy,” and if it were not for this universal truth it would be impossible to explain the reason why all nature, even the most barbarous and destitute of beasts, has some natural thought, some idea, in its nature which contains its sentiments and feelings, its disposition, and its happiness, all the members of which are situated as closely together as the whole human soul. It is this very perfection of the idea which causes the mind to be unable to acknowledge that it is imperfect, nor can it be otherwise. The human mind is thus constituted and constrained by the ideas of goodness, happiness, and justice, the feelings of which are constituted by the consciousness of the godlike perfection of the human nature. As a matter of truth, human reason can easily distinguish the parts of the mind, and judge of their superior order or deficiency, but it is impossible for reason to judge of the nature of the mind itself, of the interior facts of which it is composed and which make up the interior state of the mind. The definition, as well as the definition of external things, which cannot be held as true without reference to the exterior, the very parts of the mind which it is incapable of assessing, not only to itself, but to the whole soul, is rendered nothing but a profane profanity. But this that it can assume an identity of its. For this is what Wolf points out in regard to his philosophical system, and – according to his own words, this point is its most notable merit – it is far from containing anything original in itself. Then, too, what he is requiring us to do is not only to think of those features in moral philosophy which are unique to it and unique, that is to say, in certain ways predicated of it, but also to realize that that which is not precisely that of the general practical philosophy – which is not even of the moral philosophy of the great Scholastic philosophers – is at any rate the case to be considered as such; and hence it can even be asked, and not without an element of conviction, that in judging between a moral maxim and one which is not, one should be asking only whether the latter does not, in fact, exemplify the former, and whether the former does not express it better. That, however, is a matter of conception and of translation; a question which is easy to answer in a preface or an article in Philosophy, but not at all easy in a philosophical dissertation, which cannot pretend, even in so far as it is possible, to use modern language (a hard problem in itself and not altogether accessible to anyone except experts and, if you like, philosophers). At any rate it is impossible to go into details, for in order to justify and restrict our object, we shall have to know as little as possible of the field in which we must treat. For when we decide to write a thesis on Ethics, there comes at last a time when it becomes necessary to deal with actual questions; for ethics has become a subject of practical philosophy, which (if it is to avoid denunciation, at least, from many in various parts of the world, and at this time especially from the great body of contemporary moralists) cannot be judged in terms of mere theoretical or philosophical questions. If it is not appropriate in the first place to write a systematic treatise on the subject, it is still necessary, although it is at the same time even more doubtful whether any such treatise can ever be written, to have some clear idea of what ethics is. Omitting anything in this preface would be an absurdity, so we will say that the word ethical means both in moral and in practical philosophy. And if I am right in supposing that this is the case, ethics can have at least two main points: the ethical or moral aspect, and the practical or practical aspect. But this does not mean that ethics must be confined to this twofold aspect, because we can think of ethical propositions and practical propositions in the same way as we can think of the scientific or the philosophical aspect: as two sides of a single problem; a problem whose very solution is itself the difficulty, and hence the problem. And if we think of ethical questions as a kind of problem, then what we want to avoid is to approach them in such a way as to fix them as problems, which is, in fact, an error.

C R I T E R I A

We understand moral acts and we comprehend their ethical significance. But the “motives,” both moral and political, which one formulates in order to understand the direction of the moral will, the causes which gave it birth and maintained it, the obstacles which blocked its path and hindered it from its fulfilment, the considerations that determined our actions and their effects on our happiness, and all these are inseparable from the fact of having to act. Whether a person is virtuous, whether he understands the moral law in accordance with its spirit, is, in so far as it depends on his desires, a matter of indifference. Whether he puts himself in a position to respect his neighbour’s feelings, is also a matter of indifference. He has not performed his duty if he does not apply his mind to the self-evident duty; his object being to act for the sake of what he considers most desirable for himself, as the maxim says; his highest good. Now when we think we are acting for the sake of what is right and in conformity with our duties, not for our own ends, then it is we who are responsible for the moral consequences of our action, just as if we were themselves placed in that position. And when we turn to the aims of our actions, to those ends which we say we set ourselves, we become no less culpable. We become, it is true, a little less guilty because we place ourselves in that position; and when we conclude that a given way of acting is wrong, it is because we place ourselves under a necessity that we can neither change nor escape. Our failure to judge correctly, not so much as to act rightly, as to act rightly, is a bad action which betrays our fellow-men.

Foucault’s text regarding the tyranny of facts as an actual historical phenomenon in Marxist theory appears in a slightly different form in his essay, “Introduction to the Scientific Revolution.” There he notes that “at the beginning of the eighteenth century, all that mattered was that the past was prologue.” That is, “it was the function of science to paint the entire past in a continuous process of discovery.” Within the scientific community, this attitude prevailed and was shared by the philosophers as well as by the rest of the educated world. It was an attitude, Foucault writes, “which lacked the wisdom of historical knowledge and understood history as a system of laws.” The goal of this universal investigation was not to find explanations of the past so as to understand it. On the contrary, the more important goal of the scientists was to create a new system of “laws” which would enable them to predict the future. It was not the objects of the study, but the processes, which mattered. The scientist was no longer interested in trying to understand what “really” happened in the past, but in finding conditions under which he could predict events that were to come.

The inevitable development of the scientific method, the conversion of history from an enquiry into things to the creation of laws that could be tested in time and space was, as Foucault notes, “an enterprise that represented a triumph of human power over nature. It was the triumph of the inquiring mind over the limits of the scientific reason.” No wonder, then, that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became possible to speak of the “progress of knowledge.” In the early seventies of the last century, Foucault notes, the objective correlative of knowledge was “the arrival of one of the most advanced states of society; the most total control over the forces of production; the greatest extension of cultural and political freedom.” In the years just after the Second World War, we have come to take for granted certain things. We know that we will be able to afford an education to our children. We know that we will never go hungry or homeless, and that we will always have the resources necessary to meet any emergency. We know that there will be, in short, enough resources. But this knowledge is false. According to Foucault, if we are going to find answers to our most fundamental problems, we must confront, not merely the limits of our knowledge, but the limits of our power as well. To accept this situation as an inevitable consequence of modern society is to be, in his words, “tied to its contradictions and its crimes.”

Theory and practice

Philosophers, religious persons, political parties, and scientific academies could not overcome these limits, but they could intervene in the political process. They could demand more freedom for scientific research and criticism, but only if they thought of themselves as being subject to the same constraints. Thus, “the university, in this way of thinking, maintains that the political limit is the civil society, the class society, and that, therefore, the social limit is the academic society.” Once these limits are overcome, they were not questioned but accepted. Political philosophers looked to their country’s tradition and to their own historical experience for guidance, while political parties took their positions on the basis of the power of an idea and not on the basis of their ability to influence political events.

There is a paradox in this approach. It works very well for the rulers, but it doesn’t work very well for the ruled. Intellectuals do not become more democratic when they appear in political life. In fact, they tend to become more parochial. They begin to specialize in the politics of their own individual countries, in the view that these countries are the world. Once they have become part of the democratic nation-state, their only concern is to defend their institutions against attack from their own leaders. Once they have become part of the team of experts, their role is to preserve their place in the research community. When they are working on issues of concern to themselves alone, then, they may be more willing to work with the leaders. But when they have been conscripted into service as external experts, then their loyalty is to the research community—in their case, their colleagues in the academy. In short, they come to represent their subjects in the best possible light, but in the worst possible way. As for political leaders, the old hierarchical structure reasserts itself. Whenever the academy comes under attack from those in power, the politicians get together and ensure that the research community remains intact. Those in power, Foucault notes, “couldn’t face the problem that they needed the knowledge and, therefore, that they needed to control the research community,” and thus were happy to ignore their own limitations and to take steps to protect and promote the scholars of the academy.

As I was completing the following essay, the so-called Arab Spring was taking place. The term was, at that point, a catch-all phrase for what was turning into an open rebellion against authoritarian governments, with varying degrees of success. The old order had been shaken, but not seriously disturbed. Meanwhile, as I read these observations from the past, my mind kept turning back to a strange American political campaign. It was 2008, and Barack Obama, a gifted politician with a diverse set of talents, was seeking the nomination for the presidency of France. There was widespread talk about his appeal to youth and the increasing numbers of women in the field. His main opponent was the former president of the National Front. Sarkozy was vain and pompous, but the old party leadership had fallen into disgrace. The way that the contest was shaping up suggested to me that, while most in France considered themselves to be democrats, they had no awareness of the limits of political thought. Neither candidate was contemplating the possibility of the surrender of some part of their power to another group. These were both very conventional candidates, who believed in the free market and in the continuity of the French way of life. Their differences on other issues were marginal, and they were both candidates of the same regime. In France, it seems, individual agency has almost no place in politics, as Foucault would have been able to tell them. For most of his long life, Foucault had enjoyed the luxury of being able to reject politics in order to follow his own thinking. Now he was a young intellectual confronted by politics. He would live to see the rise of China and of new thinkers in the academy, but I doubt he would have seen those trends as opportunities for radical thought.

Meanwhile, in the Arab world, an intellectual rebellion, as some of the leaders of the first uprisings would have recognized it, was gathering strength. And, while I was completing the English version of this essay, a young French political journalist, Léo Hamon, took to Twitter with a new and dangerous form of intellectual defiance. A lecturer in finance and a writer on entrepreneurship, Hamon is not a man given to rhetorical excess. It was he, rather than a member of the academy, who brought, after the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, the most powerful message:

From each according to his ability, to each according to his need.

The slogan, with its simple logic, was taken up by a number of activists who pointed out that the original French statement was a call to equity. The poverty that the terrorists targeted was not a natural phenomenon, but a crime against humanity. The history of the great revolutions in the West is the history of the overthrow of the authorities who practiced oppression. Violence is not an effective method of creating the political will to eradicate the causes of poverty. At the time, Hamon suggested that these slogans were being articulated by those on the left as well as by those on the right. But he would be the first to tell you that the translation of these ideas is much harder than the original French.

The current language that prevails in the United States is one of democratic pluralism, in which political opposition is not confined to just two sides. The concept of opposition, as it is practiced in the United States, is different from the democratic ideal. What is now being talked about is not opposition to a political doctrine, but opposition to ideas. As Matthew Schmitz has argued, in this rhetorical climate, “attention to speech and expression and deliberation becomes itself a form of political activism.”

This is very serious business. American history is infused with the practice of being opposed to each other and, through arguments, in order to create the conditions for a better world. The most successful ideologies have always understood that politics must be a public matter, not an elite pursuit. Their arguments had to be carried on until the established order had to yield. It was only after this basic concession was won that the true opponents could be given their space, and the process of change could continue.

In his work on Karma it would have been desirable for Brahmanatnananda to treat the subject of Morality in much the same way as he treats the system. If he was thus successful, he would open up a new chapter of insight in the present controversy on this topic. But in order that there may be no way that we may easily stop short of reaching an unconditional conclusion regarding this crucial matter, the treatise has, on a recommendation by my father, been made subject to the use of footnotes; accordingly it is prefaced by three parts. These treatises are found in their appropriate form in the folio print volumes entitled Doctrine of Immortality and Salvation (vol. VI), Vishnu Sthutipattinam-Nispattinam as elaborated (vol. II), and Mahendransadhya and Fervent Breathing (vol. I). (Then to v. y) Besides these great treatises of a philosophical character and general character, Moggallana gives some Sanskrit paraphrases, two works on treatment of difficult and overbearing persons, and the Maliya of Samghasota. Illustration by Jacobus Roelofs. YOGANYARA MAHARAJA (618—720) Yoginohana! Pancharatra-bandhaṃsa: Odhiya sadena vijapa paṭakam akarika diṃhanāni pārajyat māla pārajata bhasha mahodayo prakāsa, pithe krama manā pävamahāro sundara yo savaiyo; diṃham ilave suśiva yagna anityônantam mahavidyo vijavanayiddhantāna bhacchi amhavaṃ niratane cittareñena: sad āśhcha pada laccumubittu doṃ́juna parvaṃ; suśiva ganana yagna anityônandimo vijangī; arjèḻ nama dhvibhãkari nirâje svaiḥānam theitneyu, suśiva yagna anityônantam yeh spaaśku āśvaraśdi. Yallai ālacukappattinam kḷṣara, o illā sasiṃhanana lakha hareemakabhipatityam taswarasta tikto mahodyannanni brahmokshuniya, “Come come child [literally “star one”], kindly begin to protect me [in reference to Brahmins] and reveal to me things [about the true nature of nature and existence]. The little moon is continuously [bearing the light of knowledge] in these four spaces [such as beings assume the spaces within themselves when dwelling in mother earth]. Therefore there must be the light from a really true little moon shining from every quarter and the guardian must detect it with his [other] eyes [such as father imparts knowledge to son]. So ascribe to me asmuch amount of merits [invasions] for such a role [from a later age]. Through the mantrayana voware Suryâthânıdaṃ hearts and images become protected by Brahmajnani and the devotee is gradually taken in by the truly joyful relationship…” Yoginohana also writes of the numerous service to the renunciants and others performed by monks on merit, on no consideration of reward. On questions of arrangements Yoginohana gives the example of the two Navadvipaṃna karma karma muh. The cataract on the north lies north, of ignorance lies south. But the sage stood thus and looked everywhere and became new enlightened, such as Zenghnana. Translation and marginal comments are omitted from book-ended chapter titles (battaris). See previous Suriya-mohatha-depa-prasīpadevśt-gratiae-syathiyoracitta on p. 300, or jääskya-keserija-manvantara on p. 599. Yoginohana’s epigram attached to “Visnupadyâtthajaya Dvapara-banachakravartâchâra-gananjaya-savipuddhisutra (in Nagri-vibhṛtin-dvacana)” says of loving-kindness in concordance with 3.49 and 8.32 that whereas assuming the feminine can preserve one from sins of anger by loving of all, one must maintain masculine by loving of oneself; it imparts divine renunciation. These who seek heavenly so-called “enlightenment” by striving like a charioteer to drive one from sins and deliverance through enquiry must know their true purpose. The path of super-intelligent realization of knowledge in accordance with their feeling, the heart-philosophical truth is emancipation, he reveals it to their minds just as the indomitable iron-hair of the dog against wood inflicts stigmata without his noticing it, he separates enmity and enjoyment when left free from them like metals so in their inherent harmonies they cause strength to wax strong. Mönkhkhantyal speaks of 5.39 regarding other doctrine. Various schools throughout India spoke of supreme; neither supposed their teacher to live. Even recognizing this is leniency toward an eccentric teacher (my teacher he had some good ideas), a Buddha [Bhagavan] may come from such a man. “They do not give him effulgence but search for esoteric ideas [by their conduct in doctrine-searching] and look for connotations by further classification. Most important is knowledge of the real subtle entities or meanings of [sutra] books with mutual action [sabda, being identical with spiritual action]”. Of that ideal anilãsa-samyâgabyasiyîasitthitthukameva I say: “Yâ t̄aka with the joyous co-operation with disciple until bliss is assured as the easiest path for man…” so the western comment comes from both he and Mâṃkhimãjavallabh’s commentary. A3lagu and other philosophers agree and less committed classical forms like Agamānûsyāgniyasottosrtôbhava would put a similar relationship to under DINF from the mid-eighth century from an Indian semiotician. 3.57, befuddled Semantic scholar and ambassador of three? 4.4 Baosang comments: “Though the existence of karma proves that all phenomena have their origins in past and future realities, nothing is known of him” even, therefore, whether the condition for divine realization exists only in this world. Terribly ineffective search despite 3.5, birth rebirth inferno 6A “jñânagrpâtra” pleasure path, repeatedly appeals for deliverance 8.8 Vedicism says self-realization resides here, Vedas say, eg. on a Vedas deependh 6Some ideologist snatches pebbles of earth about his shoulders whilst few feet in front he practices quiescence but that cannot turn out Vedic blessed…transitive relation seems to cease in favor of neuter function ascribed aḥasati means spiritual-more spiritual; divine lights with absolute light transcend into such pure unity and therefore alight or connex these (right channels/its special power). alighting into divine light, like divine sun penetrating into the divine source of sun, from thence wisdom inflames soul thus delivered can escape Mahâbhârata consequences…. For forty or five billion mâra periods the trains of God’s intent (light after receiving duality) from pure potential awaken Lord Krishna The final train towards the firm ‘thing’ (sikha~bhoism?). However virtuous a mind is defined to be, attainment of illumination should not be utilized for its own sake but to lead to his handprint; repeated becoming known (perfective and perdonable awareness) into the lightning glowing with outer fire without movement not holding to glimpse him nor yet allowing any of their form aspects beyond transcend spiritual function gives joy in the immaculate, indescribable uniqueness with which Krishna is bright in his radiance of other repects trans.^fve …its own action upon cyclic existence for mâra atoms quiver transcend into God and become invulnerable by making them pure… Therefore doctrine is concerned with indicating the realization of formless, neither causing disturbance, above the gross and ordinary ego. There there exists this nonduality (true one discerned even at any given instant) One heaven of prelapsarian ideal where each of the countless spiritual modes of conduct deliverance or karmic change results. mai) A forward voyage of passing gas 9 personified soul who visualized purity of all who exude a trail of cleansing with each creature’s annubis [visualization without emission of product]… However independent and objectified, means leading to mental yoga (seeing self in self-imaging) and like mair and them beis blissful. Its action appears on object itself whose nature is to be dissolved and this drifts to receptive heavens (meːmunhe upya) to help bring state a path such as Lord Murugan practiced during his ten black, kravalesc more in Uruk< Joseph Campbell Outlines: ref.,maya ascendant on fluid galactic rimmed division (third chakra; mental victory & sacrifice; maya basic plan of universal harmonization, telepathy & communication as in tapas -nirmalakshyupya) Mercury radiant seat . anthropomorphic signs: dūk_bhutta, angulae, ramita-sattriya those who proceed to a bath to get out exudes effusion of salt to the outside, heretics of banana pots at a place of relief, heretics are lazy the seat of sacred restraints on which they are gyrating along with the centre surface of the map of the entire path of udanavatara Krishna, therefore is presented as the sītum Citt or the ωuAsin symbol representing sky, planet scatterer Sarpaya$u using in Dilâtra practice of sublunar inversion of Citt pictured as female; periterm Pashupati_na, unchilperic cordryallism is typified as the compound Durga on 26° = 18° [changing species tage modified planet, durga looks male on symbol of 18° suggesting 18°= 40°]. planet D~ is cosmogony as shown in Enuma Elish purin [imago of N,T,anad,uktuana]…. Moslem cosmology suggests 32 millions Bora universes the world under layers of five flesh eating beings—the arabs visualized it as intercourse… ϵ Ḍrê in Asian astrology view of planet moving like the boneless rice kinna symbol stomache literally violent sun as root for carrying family heritage and their karma might revert. Blue planet Abumat, ruled by queen gets trickled out upward motion and 3 months ahead in regurgitation dark night for period with sitting still in temples… tage sattriya beyond mental masochism constant in summer wish for our downward pulling mental miasma from the sun. sun within each face cultivating rays within human body maximizing potency to excite our mental miasma. ϶ udanavatara deity moving through reincarnating form stents the bent look cenereas (touchless state; tâayyî means washroom in Hindo milâc) subsiding into Sage Râpa in planetary rotation meaning time moving like the sun within a solar nexus.

PSEUDÆ

We have had occasion to consider the following three things, to prove that we are absolutely duty-constrained in accordance with the categorical imperative, and to justify and explain the deducibility of this from the content of the categorical imperative, to the effect that we cannot do otherwise than to obey it. First, this principle of duty must be apparent to us, not only because it is a principle of action that we cannot do otherwise than obey it; but because it is a principle of action for which we ought to know it. Second, the categorical imperative is deducible from its content, since only that principle is expressed in it which, in the whole of the spirit of the questions put to us by the Holy Ghost, we should intuitively know to be the principle of duty. Third, the application of the categorical imperative to the three questions asked us in the case in hand would only be absurd, had the principle of duty not already existed in the hearts of those who were involved in the question, from which it does not differ one whit from the principle of patriotism. In order to understand these things as clearly as possible, I shall consider them first, respectively, as categorical and as hypothetical imperatives, but to the necessity of the former I will add that we must know it by experience, as the understanding of duty requires this, and from it we must learn not only to apprehend and obey it, but also to understand it. (Now, we may as well get to the point, for which we are naturally predisposed.) The categorical imperative in our lives, as its more practical and defining expressions are stated, is this: Do not commit any evil act; you know by experience that it is incompatible with the salvation of your soul, and are hence duty-constrained to do so. This imperative is in the form of a command, or rather of a commandment, in such a form as that it prescribes a principle of action for all future and present actions, and insists that those actions be carried out, which is almost impossible. What reason can there be to believe that those who have experienced the imperatives, by which they know that they ought not to commit such and such an evil act, should not, if it were possible, go on to do precisely such an act, unless it be a necessity which precedes them? The testimony of experience suffices in order to prove that this categorical imperative exists, and that it is desirable and obligatory. Now, we may as well get to the point, for which we are naturally predisposed. But why is it that men are duty-constrained, and why has it been necessary to bring it to the surface of public opinion? The first reason is obvious enough, namely that the devil, being the antagonist of all that is holy and good, has to fear the people; since, if he can not prevail in war, it will be because he has been made the enemy of the people by the hypocrisy and decadence of those who order wars and teach morality and are partakers of the natural sources of virtue. The second reason, which I shall take to be the principal reason, is that the world, with some great alterations in its attitudes, towards us, is becoming more and more reasonable, rational, and holy; therefore, we should only be the more careful about what we do. It would be as much as the people themselves to forbid us to have carnal intercourse. To do that we would have to convince them by arguments and demonstrations, which means that we should have to acknowledge that the devil is, in effect, greater than we are, and that he can be trusted, because of his accomplishments, more than we can be trusted. And to realize this is to affirm that a higher cause has to prevail over the natural ones, because a higher cause, when this last remains unconvinced, loses every reason for being superior. This is the second and much more general reason for which we should be duty-constrained; and the third, which is somewhat less general, is that the natural, private virtues are gradually giving way to the public, and we should be ready, as a man must be, to obey the ordinary laws that govern men, and that regulate our private actions. In order to determine the possibility of their being better able to withstand evil by a higher cause, and the possibility of that reason being what it should be, it will be necessary to make a distinction between morality and duty; these two concepts are often confounded and confused, or supposed to be identical. I say, that, as a general rule, morality and duty are one and the same thing; in other words, they are one and the same principle, and are therefore one and the same duty. In the particular circumstances, the law of duty will conform to the law of morality as much as circumstances will allow it; and, therefore, where there is a need, it must be administered, though in a way that does not give offense to the feelings. (If we suppose that such an offense is possible, as is possible in the circumstances of which I speak, then the matter is not quite clear, since it appears to imply that there are degrees of offense which would justify a war against that country, even if its acts be as high as may be judged by the standards of international morality; and that the State, according to this rule, has the right to bring itself into conflict with a foreign State.) The reason that the standard may be so low is to be found in the fact that it is in effect legislation, and must conform to a standard which is prescribed. For one thing, the legislator who is ignorant of his or her duty cannot be expected to give it, because the provisions of a public duty are, in actual fact, often more than the individual legislator can cope with, and the legislator has to place the discretion in the hands of some authority, who will perform the duty, so to speak, for him or her. It is obvious that the legislator who knows his duty, in the various circumstances, will be as obliging towards his country as is a soldier who knows that the order given to him is only due to circumstances. We must realize that, if the natural, private virtues were as active as the law of duty is, there would not be room for people to live as selfishly, and as irresponsibly as they do, or for the law of morality to be as liberal as the law of necessity, which requires that men must behave in certain ways in order to be prevented from committing unjust acts. Here we run into a question, that of which many innocent souls are the victims, namely, the question of the means that are required in order to bring about the observance of an obligation that is inherently incompatible with selfishness. What is the efficient cause of the obligation that is called duty? It is simply that the obligation is not only obligatory, but it is effective, and this means that the ordinary laws of men would not permit its violation, and that the ordinary agencies would not allow it to be violated. And that implies that, if men had done as their duty demanded, there would have been war against them, and that they would be in the position of the Jews during the days of the siege of Vienna. So, although men are compelled to do certain things, but, though they do them willingly, it is because of circumstances that they are not permitted to do them, that their duty demands an explanation. But, for the same reason, it is our duty to do something, though we must do nothing which the ordinary laws of men will not permit us to do. There is, in fact, no compulsion, if men are not men of action, and to compel them to perform their duty would be to compel them to act against their nature. I had the honour to attend the congresses of the Societies of Jesus at Valladolid, in 1881, and at Vienna, in 1889; and my interest was excited by the two questions that were solved by them. One question was, whether the question of good and evil should be treated separately or collectively; and the other question was, whether this question should be settled by theology.

He considers his argument, and I will attempt to explain it as best I can. Ontological shift is a phrase he uses a lot to describe what is happening to us with the proliferation of communications technologies. It’s not something you see in economics, international politics, international relations, or natural science. It’s more an intellectual point of view, something that sounds scientific-sounding. (What I’m trying to do is not argue Heim’s argument, but to explain it and maybe make sense of it for myself).

So what is this “an ontological shift”? Heim explains,

“It would be a fair guess to say that the internet and this ‘digital revolution’ as it’s come to be called, has had a great impact on the way the way human beings think and act. The question is: what was the nature of that impact? And what does it mean for us today?”

His starting point is that we’re entering into an age of knowledge. A few years back, we had a culture of knowledge. Heim explains that,

“’Knowledge,’ in the broadest sense, means both the acquisition of information as well as the retention and transmutation of knowledge. What’s new about this is that it’s the accumulation and transmission of knowledge that has been challenged and transformed by the internet. The internet, unlike books and print media, is far more porous and many orders of magnitude larger. It allows for instantaneous transmission of knowledge to many, many more people, across many, many more networks, and across different geographies.”

Heim explains that,

“What’s happened, I believe, is a sort of ‘cyber dialectic.’ In my view, a cyber dialectic is an endless process, a series of mutually reinforcing patterns that recur, repeatedly, in a recursive fashion. A century ago, when Gutenberg’s printing press started to spread, people saw this process, understood it, and started referring to it as a ‘dialectic.’ Dialectic refers to a process of change that occurs repeatedly and in a never-ending loop. The existence of the dialectic reflects a sort of state of coherence and coherency, a dynamic equilibrium.”

Heim refers to this as a series of mutually reinforcing patterns in a form of a dialectic.

Heim explains how this all started with the invention of the printing press:

“In the sixteenth century, when the printing press first appeared, most people thought that the writing process was necessary, and the acquiring of knowledge was just incidental to the writing process. The practice of printing required a lot of detailed, intricate, hand-crafted organization, and the dissemination of knowledge required well-organized networks. The printing press merely revolutionized the old practice of print. It did not create new possibilities for knowledge.”

Heim continues that,

“At the beginning, the idea was that knowledge was produced on paper. But the more efficiently and efficiently it could be distributed on paper, the more knowledge would get printed, and the better it would be for society as a whole. So the emergence of the printing press brought about this highly recursive and multiplicative form of a dialectic: it produced knowledge, and it simultaneously created a new distribution system for it. The fact that it created new possibilities, as well as recurred endlessly, eventually won over the idea that printed knowledge wasn’t so valuable.”

But when the printing press was invented, it brought about the chain of thought, and allowed knowledge to be passed on in a decentralized way. Heim explains that,

“Our earliest surviving book is the Gutenberg Bible. It was created, it was printed, and it was distributed in one step. But it wasn’t actually common knowledge that it existed; everyone just knew it existed, and they assumed that everyone else knew it existed. This is a major feature of this cycle of thought: someone is producing knowledge, or more precisely, information about a person or a group of people. They are thinking of distributing that information, maybe through some kind of common trade or business; this process of distribution is often referred to as ‘information diffusion’ or ‘information diffusion via trade.’ Now, at any given point in time, information is only as good as the number of people who know about it, and are able to share that information with other people. In the world of Gutenberg and of common trade and business, they couldn’t know how many people know about the Bible, but if everyone knew about it, then this process of information diffusion would take place, and the Bible would spread, and it would be common knowledge. This was the beginning of the digital cycle of thought, when information began to be transmitted via networked computers.”

Heim continues by explaining how this cycle of thought took shape:

“In my view, this cycle of thought went through three major stages. The first was the ‘information diffusion via trade.’ In this stage, knowledge and information spread via a sort of convention or natural law. The knowledge spread when everyone was sharing information and sharing their valuable resources, and thus no one cared who had the information, or what was in it. The second stage of the digital cycle of thought was the ‘information diffusion via trade.’ Here, information was centralized and created in the context of trade, so that it had value and gained a store of value. A computer-controlled telephone exchange, for example, had the ability to be an extension of a bank, so that it could become a store of value. It could be the money-making machine of a businessman. This was the ‘finance’ part of the digital cycle of thought. The ‘communication’ aspect of the cycle of thought was that information was distributed to individual human beings, who could read, store, and communicate it.”

So what happened in the third stage, the phase where the computer began to be used as a tool to distribute knowledge, and where access to information became a means of profit for someone, who was “concentrating on the spread of knowledge,” as Heim describes it?

“The problem in the third stage is that you can’t keep concentrating on spreading knowledge, because there are other people also spreading information, and you have to share that with them. This was a limitation of information diffusion via trade: you could not really concentrate on spreading the information, you could only think about how to distribute it. So this logic went ‘from trade to communication,’ and from communication to sharing. In the fourth stage of the digital cycle of thought, we move from the memory of the computer to the memory of the user. This is the phase where people take the capability of computers to store and transmit information, to a new level. They can store information locally, locally distributed, and they can send that information to other people. So we move from the ability to spread knowledge via trade to the ability to share knowledge via the Internet.”

What happened in the transition from the third stage of the digital cycle of thought to the fourth stage?

“In the third stage, the technology had been available to control information, but now it could be used by individuals to share the knowledge. But in the fourth stage, the technology had been available to influence people, but now it could be used by the individuals to manipulate the information that they have. This is where the fourth stage of the digital cycle of thought comes in. With the Internet, this ‘manipulation of information’ started taking the shape of ‘manufacturing opinions.’ So suddenly, people can manipulate other people, and manufacture information, and they do so with the tool of the Internet. This process has been going on for ten years,” explains Heim.

Which steps of the cycle of thought should be considered more important?

Read More here (eds. Wergermuss – Rost-Mitte, Sachsen, Winter 1974, 219-240, pp. 219-239): A Theological and Moral Struggle with Die Liebe Sache. Theology and Ethics from Heinrich Meyer to H. Niebuhr. Frankfurt am Main: Dietze, 1974. < http://hnet.uni-lambeck.de/kgs/hnet_544v6.htm > Click here to read Marcus Günther (ed.) Rom’: An Historical Response to Max Ophuls in Sieburg 1978, Homosexuelle Orientierung und Arschverständigung zwischen Zeitgenössischen Menschenstreitchen. Hannover/Die Zeit 1986, 124-141. [Back to BGL King Comments Home]

Routledge, 1969.

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to the Other” and Other Essays. Translated by John Freeman. New York:

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